Category: Old Blog

The Moral Limits of Markets

On 13 October, 2013

In August 2012 five people went on trial in China for facilitating illegal organ trading after a student was found to have sold his kidney in order to buy an iPad. In the subsequent reporting of the incident, the case was held up as an example of the foibles of a world obsessed with consumption; a world in which everything has a price. Even though I agree that such transactions should be prohibited, the focus on whether or not people are materialistic somewhat misses the point. The salient question is not to do with the morality or immorality of consumerism, but rather a question about the boundaries of legitimate state intervention in the affairs of private individuals.

I’m going to outline a couple of reasons there may be for wanting the state to stop these sorts of transactions. One reason is that if a market in a particular good or service corrupts the social meaning of a good, then it is legitimate to restrict the sale of that good. The main problem with this argument is that it is quite illiberal. It can permit the Institutionalised restriction of the rights of citizens on the basis of reasons with which they may radically disagree, even if those rights have no harmful implications for anyone else. So, for example, the argument could be deployed in a country where a majority of Christian citizens object to the sale of kidneys on religious grounds. The Christian citizens may attempt to restrict the commodification of kidneys because they believe that Cup human organs are a sacred gift from God which should not be ‘corrupted’ by monetary valuation. Now consider if there was a minority of atheists in this country. The atheist minority can reasonably disagree with the religious justification for the laws restricting wholesale nba jerseys their choice to sell their kidney. The atheist minority could protest that they are not being treated as equals; a comprehensive doctrine that they do not accept is being used to restrict their liberty. They are not being permitted Markets to act as they choose, despite these actions having no harmful implications for any other members of society.

A second (and better) reason for restricting markets is that people may only sell particular types of goods or services when they were in situations of such dire economic necessity that it constitutes cheap nfl jerseys a kind of coercion. Michael Sandel sums up this position well, he writes ‘a peasant may agree to sell his kidney or cornea in order to feed his starving family, but his Proudly agreement is not truly voluntary. He is coerced, in effect, by the necessities of his situation.’ I suspect this is why most people, me included, may want the state to step and stop these Jerseys kinds of transactions. But people who are sympathetic to this view might want to consider a couple of problems with the argument. The first thing to note about this argument is that it is not an objection to markets per se, rather it is an objection to markets which operate under highly asymmetrical Jerseys background conditions. Therefore, it Jerseys could not provide a reason to prevent a wealthy person selling their kidney. Another potential problem is that the Age transaction is paternalistic – it says that people who are in poverty are incapable of making a choice which they perceive as increasing their well-being simply cheap nfl jerseys because they have few resources.

An Age Old Old Age Question

By Justice Everywhere Archive

On 6 October, 2013

In Distribution, Health, Old Blog

It is a truth universally acknowledged that the UK population is ageing. To be precise, by 2050 there will be 19million people aged over 65. What is more rarely acknowledged is the scale of the problem this poses. Old age is the price any society pays for improved health care; the trouble is our society simply cannot afford to pay it. In an ideal world of unlimited resources the just solution may be for the state to cover the costs of everyone’s social care. Alas we do not live in such a world. A years stay in an older people’s residential home can cost upwards of £30000. Multiply that by 950 000 (around 5% of older people currently require care) and the bill is staggering.

I intend outline three practically feasible alternative payment mechanisms and consider some of the potential injustices these systems may pose. There will be no 500 word dash to the most plausible/least objectionable/insert-political theory-phraseology here solution. I simply wish to generate some debate around one of the least fashionable, but most pressing, policy issues of our generation. Additionally, I would like to implore political theorists to consider justice through the lens of a real world policy problem. We do not only ourselves but our society a disservice if we are unwilling to be stirred from our ivory towers to get down and dirty in the dilemmas of real world policy making. And in any case, in 50 years time we will all be reaping the life that we sow now.

So, possible solution one: make individuals pay, but provide a safety net for those who cannot. This is pretty much how the system operates in the UK at present. There are two main problems with this. First, the safety net care paid for by the state is inadequate. State funded care is poor in quality and choice and, with the pressure on it increasing, is only likely to get worse. The NHS is based around the intuition that people should not receive inferior care because they cannot afford to pay – why should this be any different in older people’s care? Second, it is highly debateable whether it is fair to ask people to pay for their own care. Not everyone who gets old will need social care. Is it fair to ask an old person who is unlucky enough to need care to pay, often exhausting all their assets in the process, when their neighbour of good health will not part with a penny?

Solution two: up taxes such that all care can be funded. Putting to one side the usual questions that surround high taxes (will it destroy the UK economy, will the super rich move abroad and so on) this seems to be unfair because it places the bulk of the burden on the younger generation. Those who are already retired will avoid having to pay for their care without ever paying any form of punishing tax for it. Given the youth of the UK are already facing greater economic hardships and fewer opportunities than their parent’s generation, is it fair to disadvantage them further by levying a new tax? Or is this one off disadvantage one society must accept for a better care system for future generations? Further, is such a tax sustainable? The latter is an empirical question which depends on economic recovery and projections. In any case, any tax that would be sufficient to cover the scale of the problem would need to be substantial.

Solution three: people are left to insure themselves against the risk of expensive social care. There are already companies that provide services akin to this, but premiums are so high that few people choose to opt for them. This may be more palatable than high taxes because people choose whether or not to insure themselves against the risk of high costs, meaning it is less financially punishing and less paternalistic. Unfortunately, the flip side of an absence of paternalism if that people may fail to insure themselves altogether, meaning people could be forced to pay high costs for their bad decisions in later life. It is my opinion that some form of compulsory insurance system may be the least unpalatable option, not least because old people insuring themselves now would pay significantly more than young people, and pay this equally, thus baring the cost of their generation’s care themselves. However, additional to the problem of paternalism this measure would also be highly inconsistent. There are many things it may be beneficial for people to insure themselves against that are not compulsory. How could this inconsistency be justified? Ultimately, my answer to that is that consistency should be an aid to justice, and not an end in itself. I for one would rather live in an inconsistent society with more just outcomes than one where consistency is pursued above all else.

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Institutionalised Truth

By Justice Everywhere Archive

On 29 September, 2013

In Old Blog

I believe that Democracy has some form of intrinsic value. The concept that each individual within a country has an input into the systems that govern their lives has a powerful allure. However in order to maximise this value, a democratic state must ensure that the information required to make informed decisions is Union? readily available to its members.

By casting my vote I am making a choice which Labour I believe will most likely bring about the state of affairs that I wish to see in the world. This requires a degree of information which allows me to predict, of the choices available to me, which will most likely result in the sorts of outcomes I wish to see occur. As our information becomes poorer, there is a substantial risk that our choices become less related to the outcomes we wish to see – as this disparity grows, the value that democracy provides to us diminishes.

Information within our society is currently too expensive, in terms of both time and resources, and consequently damages our democracy. It is expensive because, while it is easy to obtain thanks to the internet and 24/7 news channels, it has become increasingly difficult to verify. The sheer number of news sources available means that for all but the most basic questions, you will be able to find at least a semi credible source to support most sides of an argument. In the face of information overload, with limited realistic ability to discern what is true and what isn’t, it is hard to believe that one’s ability to vote according to their outcome preferences are not harmed.

My proposal is that the state set up a series of independent, wholesale jerseys highly specialised institutions, each of which have a narrow remit of either producing, or assessing the veracity of, certain information. The value of these institutions would lie in creating a clear authority on certain questions, allowing the media and general public to be better informed.

The institutions must be specialised, otherwise they risk losing the knowledge which makes them an authority on the issues they talk about. They must also be funded by the state, firstly to ensure they receive sufficient funding, but more importantly so that their neutrality is ensured and they are seen as a credible source of information (compared to say news channels and think tanks). The state has a successful track record in creating respected neutral institutions (for example central banks).

I admit at this stage my argument sounds a bit like a naïve wholesale NFL jerseys rant by a Customized liberal (semi) intellectual who is frustrated at the state of political decision making in the west. However, while this may all be perfectly true (it is), it should not remove from the important point that this would produce clear value to society.

What I am proposing has already successfully been done in some countries to a limited extent. Fiscal councils around the world, such as the OBR in the UK, provide independent projections of government budgets. In the US and the Netherlands, fiscal councils also evaluate the proposed spending plans of opposition parties so that voters may know whether they are credible options. Politifact in the US assess the degree of veracity Jerseys in the statements of politicians (however as it is a non-public institution it comes under attack for lack of neutrality – ironically by both sides of the political spectrum).

My area of knowledge is primarily economic – hence the examples given above, but I could easily see room for institutions in the areas of environmental science, medicine and law among others.

There are some obvious drawbacks of this proposal. Firstly there must be a limit of some kind imposed to the number of institutions and to their scope. What kind of questions are appropriately addressed by such institutions? How much information must the state provide the public with before it has absolved its duty? We clearly couldn’t have a thousand government owned and operated think tanks.

On a more fundamental level, I worry about the impact of having a state line on “the truth”. Many of the questions I would hope are assessed by such entities, are difficult and complex. A state line might stifle discussion on these Date areas and be a way to control debate in a country. It goes strongly against the Millian ideal of discovering truth through extensive public argument. However while this risk exists in the extreme, I do not feel it undermines a cautious move in the direction I advocate.

So wholesale NBA jerseys in summary, my argument:

1) Democracy has intrinsic value.

2) This value is linked to the information citizens have access to.

3) Currently information is too expensive in our society and the state has an obligation to lower this cost.
This cost is due to the difficulty in verifying the validity of arguments.

4) The state should set up focused independent institutions which seek to provide clear guidance on issues of import to the public.

5) Institutions of this kind do exist to a limited extent currently, do work and are a positive impact on society. We should expand on these.

Open questions:1) How much information does the state need to provide to absolve its obligation to its citizens?

2) What is the limit to the kind of questions we are comfortable providing a state researched view on?

3) Why does publicly funded media fail to provide the information the public requires? / Does it fail?

4) What are the precise questions we would ask these institutions to answer?

I’m sure there are many more beyond this initial list.

Is Luck in Labour Markets an Issue of Justice?

By Lisa Herzog

On 21 September, 2013

In Distribution, Economics, Old Blog

Labour markets can be just and unjust in many ways that go beyond the distribution of income. One is luck and predictability. Their distribution is highly unequally, and I think that this raises issues of justice.

First, take individual predictability. In order to plan your life (where you want to live, with whom, whether/when to have children etc.) it is helpful to know what kind of job you can expect to have over the next few years. If job markets are to a high degree based on luck, rather than other criteria such as merit or age, they are less predictable. Now, whether or not labour markets could or should be structured around merit (and in what sense of merit) is a controversial question. But one Union? advantage is that you can have a reasonable guess, based on your prior achievements, of what your job prospects for the next few years will be. Psychological tendencies such as over-optimism or cognitive dissonance can of course kick in, but even more so if there is less predictability.

Second, collective predictability. There are factors in the legal and social set-up of labour markets that determine, for societies as a whole, how predictable labour markets are. For example, a government can take anti-cyclical measures in a depression that keep people in jobs. Or, as Albena Azmanova has recently pointed out, the welfare state can be Classic: designed in ways that increase or decrease individuals’ flexibility, maybe offering “universal minimal employment” as a fallback option.

My impression is that much goes wrong in these respects today, and that this raises issues of justice (in addition to many other forms of injustice in labour markets).

First, unpredictability gives greater power to employers, because employees will reasonably be more risk averse, and will try to keep jobs they have, even if the conditions are such that they would otherwise want to quit. This looks like an issue of justice as such, and it can have harmful consequences if it prevents people from 11 standing up to injustices within their job, blow the whistle, etc. Secondly, and more importantly, issues of unpredictability hit different groups in society with differential force. Depending on whether you have inherited wealth or not, marketable or less marketable human capital, a family rooted in one place or full geographic flexibility, etc., unpredictable labour markets make your life more or less difficult to live.

Nonetheless, it would not be worth raising these issues as issues of justice if they could not be changed, or only at the cost of violating other values. In designing policy instruments that make job markets more predictable, one would have to be careful – otherwise one might end up, for example, with an in-group with 100% predictability and an out-group with 0% predictability. Or one might, in the long run, stifle markets so much that the economic wellbeing of the worst off is endangered. But it seems worth experimenting with different models, and learning from the experiences in other countries, in order to see what can be done (maybe we can discuss examples below). And I think there can also be cases micro-injustices about predictability, for example if a boss tells three people that they have “good chances” to be promoted, while only one can really be promoted.

One thing, however, can and should change, in my view. The role of luck in the job market should be acknowledged, and professional success (or the lack of it) should not be seen as a sign of personal worthiness (or the lack of it). We are equal as human cheap jerseys beings and as citizens, and while some may work harder than others, or be more talented than others, these things do not determine our value. So while there might be arguments in favour of de facto trying to tie job market structures more to achievement, for the sake of predictability (although I think that collective measures are far more important), we should stop fetishizing professional success. The role of luck is always going to be there, and acknowledging it might lead to a bit more solidarity among co-citizens and fellow human beings.

Should the UK be granted a referendum on membership in the European Union?

By Andrew Walton

On 15 September, 2013

In Democracy, Governance, International, Old Blog, Rights

My answer to the question posed in the thread title is a ncaa tentative ‘no’. My answer is tentative partly because I usually bestow considerable value on democratic choice and partly because I remain worried that my natural negative reaction to all Tory policy might cloud my judgement. But, to the best I can exempt myself from this partiality, I do think that the ‘no’ answer is correct. Here is my reasoning.

In the literature on secession, there wholesale mlb jerseys are two broad positions. On the one hand, some think there is a direct or primary right to secede. That is, groups always have a right to choose to leave an existing state provided that they, as a group, meet some criteria. The usual criteria are (a) being a ‘people’ with a shared set of cultural traditions or heritage distinct from those cheap jerseys of the wider nation of which they are presently a part or (b) democratic election (e.g., by majority vote). On the other hand, some think that there is ‘only’ a default or secondary right to secede. Groups have this right of only if their present government mistreats them in certain ways. Here, the right to secede is like the right to revolution. It is ‘activated’ if governments abuse citizens’ most basic rights, by, for example, torturing them or imprisoning them for their political beliefs.

My view is that secession cannot be a primary right. It seems to me too permissive to allow groups such broad discretion on leaving an existing state. In certain cases, this would permit patently unjust possibilities, such as the white South Africans responding to the end of Apartheid by voting to form an independent nation. More generally, we surely think that there are limits on what a people can choose. People do not have a right to disenfranchise part of the existing population of a nation on matters that concern them all, so why should they have a right to vote for border changes that would have the same effect?

Thus, my sense is that any right to secede from a political association must exist only on the condition that been the political association surpasses a certain threshold of injustice. If this line of reasoning is applied to the case of the EU, the UK clearly does not have a right to vote on its membership.

I guess that there are two possible objections to this view. First, it might be argued that the EU is nfl beyond a threshold of injustice. I find it difficult to see wholesale mlb jerseys how such a position could be substantiated. Indeed, given some of its decisions, such as voting rights for prisoners, I am inclined to think it propagates less injustice than the UK. But, at any rate, it clearly does not fall foul of grave human rights abuse or anything that would permit rebellion. Second, it might be argued that there is a difference between seceding from a state and seceding from a supranational organisation. I cannot say that I disagree with this thought, but I do not think that the difference will be sufficient to challenge my central claim. Whatever the differences, the EU wholesale jerseys is a political association with binding rules of membership subject to demands of justice. The parallels are not so far from much decentralised federal structures like Switzerland. So, just as I believe the people of Zug do not have a right to choose independence from the Confœderatio, I do not think the UK should be granted a referendum on European Union membership.