Category: Health

Pregnancy is not caregiving

In this post, Christie Hartley (Georgia State University) and Ashley Lindsley-Kim (University of British Columbia) discuss their recently published article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy  in which they argue against the claim that the feminist commitment that all persons are owed care could obligate pregnant persons to gestate unwanted fetuses.

Photo Credit: Tima Miroshnichenko, available at https://www.pexels.com/]

Is pregnancy a kind of caregiving? This might seem initially plausible since it is through pregnancy that essential fetal needs are met. Furthermore, at least in some societies, it is commonly thought that pregnancy is a labor of love or that continuing a pregnancy is a way of caring for another. Yet, it is a mistake to think of pregnancy in this way, that is, as a kind of caregiving. Understanding why is crucial for thinking well about the ethics and politics of abortion.

Let’s start with caregiving, which involves providing material or emotional care for another or oneself. Examples of the former include feeding, bathing, or dressing someone; examples of the latter include comforting or simply listening to another. Both types of caregiving are social practices and, as such, involve patterns of behavior that are part of a society or a group’s culture and that emerge or follow from a society or a group’s values and beliefs. Pregnancy, by contrast, is not a social practice. It’s a progressive biological condition characterized by numerous nonvoluntary changes in a female’s body. Some of these changes help maintain and support fetal development; others prepare the body for birthing and breastfeeding. While essential fetal needs (e.g., the fetus’s need for oxygen, nutrients, waste disposal) are met through pregnancy, these needs are not met through social practices.

This is not to deny that cultures have values and beliefs about pregnancy that result in social practices related to pregnancy or that pregnancy is implicated in our social lives. Regarding social practices, pregnant persons often engage in self-care for their pregnancy by, for example, consuming extra calories, or they engage in practices related to supporting fetal development by taking prenatal vitamins or avoiding certain foods. Many pregnant persons also develop a social relationship with their fetus during gestation and express a caring attitude towards their fetus. All these things influence how pregnant persons think about and respond to their pregnancy.

Yet, we should not conflate pregnancy with caregiving. Consider some important differences. Intentionally ceasing material caregiving does not involve some kind of physical intervention, such as surgery or medical care. And, for those who engage in material caregiving, when they are meeting their own needs – by eating, taking medication, etc. – they are not necessarily affecting others (at least, when they are not pregnant). These differences have to do with the fact that material caregiving lacks the distinctive kind of physical intertwinement and entanglement that characterizes pregnancy. Indeed, as the fetus comes into existence, it is necessarily integrated with the pregnant person. From the beginning of a pregnancy, when a fertilized egg implants in the uterine wall, the fetus’s internal entanglement is established. Continued development requires considerable integration with the pregnant person, in addition to the physical expansion of the pregnant person’s body.

Indeed, this kind of considerable physical intimacy is necessary for fetal development, and it is different from other types of intimacy in two important ways. First, this kind of invasive relation poses especially significant risks to a pregnant person’s health and wellbeing. A pregnant body undergoes physiological and anatomical changes – such as weight gain, fluid retention, ligament laxity, hormonal changes, and compression of soft tissues and nerves – which can be painful and debilitating. Additionally, a pregnancy person’s cardiac output increases, putting stress on the heart and putting them at persistent higher risks for cardiovascular disease and premature death for the rest of their lives. Second, physically invasive intimacy fundamentally concerns bodily integrity, and persons have a morally weighty interest in its protection. We are our bodies in an important sense, and pregnancy changes how a person’s body functions, how a person’s internal systems operate, and how a person is internally organized. Moreover, successfully carrying a fetus to term requires birthing, whether a birth is vaginal or cesarean. This is a physically traumatic end to a fetus’s invasive physical integration with a gestating person and, all by itself, raises concerns about forced pregnancy given the importance of bodily integrity.

Comparing pregnancy and material caregiving leads us to ignore the distinctive ways in which a person’s bodily integrity is at stake in pregnancy and not in caregiving. Of course, we certainly do not intend to minimize the demandingness of caregiving or its costs. We hold caregiving to be socially necessary, valuable work that can be demanding and costly and that we have a shared, moral obligation to provide. Yet, analogizing pregnancy to material caregiving suggests that pregnant persons have far more agency over what occurs in the progressive condition of pregnancy than they do. Further, considering pregnancy as a form of caregiving suggests that pregnant persons may have a moral obligation to gestate. This perpetuates the pernicious view that those who can gestate must use their bodies in the sexual and reproductive service of others. This threatens to naturalize sex-based caregiving.

In today’s political climate, thinking of pregnancy as a kind of caregiving is especially dangerous. The U.S. Supreme Court overruled Roe v. Wade in Dobbs vs. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022) and held that the U.S. Constitution does not confer a right to abortion. At this time, 12 U.S. states have almost completely banned the practice, and Florida, Iowa, Georgia, and South Carolina have banned abortion at about 6 weeks. Other states have taken measures to protect the practice and make it more accessible. In states with restrictive abortion bans, pregnant persons are legally required to gestate and, then, legally required to birth. This forces pregnant persons – overwhelmingly women – to be in the forced service of the state. Given the importance of caregiving duties, the suggestion that pregnancy is a form of caregiving provides support for such sexual servitude.  

What I Really, Really Want: Why True Preferences Matter for Nudging

In this post, Bart Engelen (Tilburg University) and Viktor Ivanković (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb) discuss their recently published article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy, where they explore what it means to have ‘true preferences’ and how this affects our understanding of autonomy and nudging.

Failing to do what we really, really want seems all-too familiar in everyday life. You might want to lead a healthier lifestyle or aspire to a career in a girl band but turn out to be too sluggish to go for a run or practice your singing and dancing skills. If you really are committed to those aims, these are clear instances where you fail to satisfy your ‘true preferences’.

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Just do(pe) it? Why the academic project is at risk from proposals to pharmacologically enhance researchers.

In this post, Heidi Matisonn (University of Cape Town) and Jacek Brzozowski (University of KwaZulu-Natal) discuss their recently published article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy in which they explore the justifiability and potential risks of cognitive enhancement in academia.

Image created with ChatGPT.

The human desire to enhance our cognitive abilities, to push the boundaries of intelligence through education, tools, and technology has a long history. Fifteen years ago, confronted by the possibility that a ‘morally corrupt’ minority could misuse cognitive gains to catastrophic effect, Persson and Savulescu proposed that research into cognitive enhancement should be halted unless accompanied by advancements in moral enhancement.

In response to this, and following on from Harris’ worries about the mass suffering that could result from delaying cognitive enhancement until moral enhancement could catch up, in 2023, Gordon and Ragonese offered what they termed a ‘practical approach’ to cognitive enhancement research in which they advocated for targeted cognitive enhancement —specifically for researchers working on moral enhancement.

Our recent article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy suggests that while both sets of authors are correct in their concerns about the significant risks related to cognitive enhancement outrunning moral enhancement, their focus on the ‘extremes’ neglects some more practical consequences that a general acceptance of cognitive enhancement may bring — not least of which relate to the academic project itself.

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Is there anything wrong with allowing oneself to feel liked by a chatbot?

In this post, Emilia Kaczmarek (University of Warsaw) discusses her recently published article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy in which she explores the ethical implications of self-deception in emotional relationships of humans with AI entities.

Photo: Free to use by Mateusz Haberny.

The popularity of AI girlfriend apps is growing. Unlike multi-purpose AI such as ChatGPT, companion chatbots are designed to build relationships. They respond to social, emotional or erotic needs of their users. Numerous studies indicate that humans are capable of forming emotional relationships with AI, partly due to our tendency to anthropomorphize it.

The debate on the ethical aspects of human-AI emotional relations is multi-threaded. In my recent article, I focus only on one topic: the problem of self-deception. I want to explore whether there is anything wrong with allowing oneself to feel liked by a chatbot.

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Redefining limited liability

Different phases of economic development call for different institutional arrangements. When an institution outlives the economic circumstances for which it was designed, it can lead to unintended negative consequences. The limited liability of corporations, at least under certain conditions, represents an example for such an institution.

Limited liability is one of the key features that distinguishes a partnership from a business corporation. When a partnership goes bankrupt, it is not just the capital of the partnership that is liable but also the private wealth of each of the partners. When a corporation goes bankrupt, by contrast, the reach of the creditors is limited to the capital that shareholders have invested in the corporation. They are off the hook as far as their private wealth is concerned.

It is easy to see why this arrangement leads to a significant increase in the capital that corporations are able to raise compared to partnerships. Which investor would turn down a setup with significant potential upside in terms of capital gain but limited downside? The justification for limited liability from a social perspective is equally obvious. Separating individual property from corporate property in this way hugely enhances financing capacity and thus output across the economy.

Limited liability under climate change

Limited liability worked well under conditions where any growth was good growth. However, independently of whether that was ever true, it is certainly not true in the 21st century. Some economic growth generates negative externalities in the form of social and environmental costs. Corporations only pay for the private costs of their production, whereas the social and environmental costs are borne by society as a whole.

The classic example in this category are greenhouse gas emissions. Corporations in the fossil fuel sector only pay for the private costs of getting the stuff out of the ground. Beyond the insufficient forms of carbon pricing in place today, corporations do not pay for the human and environmental costs measured in human deaths, respiratory disease from pollution, extreme weather events such as heat domes or atmospheric rivers, food shortages due to droughts, and loss in biodiversity. The results are overproduction and overconsumption of carbon-intensive products at inefficiently low prices.

Investor liability as a complement to carbon pricing

The conventional wisdom in the discipline of economics tells us that the most efficient way to reduce fossil fuel production and use to efficient levels is a form of carbon pricing, for example by charging a carbon tax. It is true that carbon taxes could be effective if they were both high enough and progressive. However, they clearly fall short on both counts today.

The above considerations point to a complementary regulatory lever. Under conditions of climate change, the justification for limited liability breaks down. Letting shareholders off the hook is not a good idea when doing so amplifies irresponsible corporate behaviour in the form of overproduction. Instead, in order to convince corporations to meet the challenge of producing sustainably, we have an interest to ensure that both the corporations and their investors have some skin in the game.

Note that this does necessarily imply that investors would have to be liable with all of their wealth, but a limited liability rather than zero liability would encourage corporations to price in negative externalities right away rather than wait for adequate levels of carbon pricing. One might also envisage a progressive form of liability where wealthier investors have more skin in the game than their less well-off counterparts. Indeed, if they did not, their incentives to invest responsibly would be reduced.

Extending the corporate time horizon

Corporations, their managers, and their shareholders are often criticized for maximising profit in the short-term. The current forms of carbon pricing have not succeeded in changing that. Redefining limited liability in the way sketched above promises to have an immediate impact in this regard. After all, under this arrangement, and in contrast to carbon pricing, it is not primarily up to the government to ensure that negative externalities are priced in, but it is up to the corporation and its investors. If the corporation and its shareholders get the numbers wrong, they will have to pay for it.

Some people will no doubt object that liability of this sort would represent a form of red tape restricting private business activity. They have things the wrong way round. Limited liability for shareholders is an enormous privilege bestowed on the corporate sector and its investors. As shown above, this privilege is no longer warranted, at least not for sectors with significant negative externalities. Today, corporations in the fossil fuel sector are able to privatise gains while they socialise losses. This is untenable. Reforming liability arrangements for these kinds of corporations offers one promising path of reform.

What is the real problem with food deserts?

Hispanic Sodas Sabor Tropical Supermarket Miami” by Phillip Pessar is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

This is a guest post by Emma Holmes (University of St Andrews/University of Stirling)

Why do some people choose to eat unhealthy food? Earlier this year, Kate Manne – Cornell philosopher and author of several books about misogyny – published Unshrinking, a fascinating and compelling critique of fatphobia. Throughout, she argues against moralising our food choices. There is nothing immoral about wanting to eat greasy, salty, delicious, processed food, says Manne. I agree – but I think she misses something. People’s food preferences are not just random – some people prefer to eat unhealthy foods because their desires have been shaped by an unjust system.

I’ll focus on Manne’s discussion of food deserts to make this point. A so-called ‘food desert’ is a place where there is nowhere nearby or affordable to access healthy food. The term ‘desert’ makes it sound as if this problem is naturally occurring, which it is not – food deserts are the result of urban planning decisions and they disproportionately affect poor people and people of colour. I argue that people who live in food deserts are done an injustice because they are influenced to prefer foods which are bad for their health.  

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Why policymakers should care about post-truth

Post-truth is often viewed as a threat to public affairs such as vaccination policy, climate change denialism, or the erosion of public discourse. Yet combating post-truth is rarely viewed as a priority for policymakers, and the preferred ways of combating it usually take the form of localised epistemic interventions such as fact-checking websites or information campaigns.

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Listening to executive dysfunction

Chatting with an UK psychologist over a pint, I asked if the UK, like my native Finland, currently struggles to accommodate the large number of women coming to the clinic with ADHD symptoms. He confirmed it did, and so does The Guardian, headlining “ADHD services ‘swamped’, say experts as more UK women seek diagnosis”. Likewise, the New York Post declaims how women “are diagnosing themselves with neurodivergent conditions such as ADHD (attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder) after watching trending TikTok videos”.

ADHD is a neurodevelopmental disability characterized by differences in sustained attention, impulse control, and motor activity. Not all symptoms need to be present for all patients: symptom presentation can differ among people with ADHD. In the 1980s and 1990s, responses to this heterogeneity have included the advent of concepts such as ADD (attention deficit disorder without hyperactivity) and ADHD ‘subtypes’. However, neither subtypes nor a differential ADD diagnosis are any longer recognized, and it is instead accepted that ADHD presents in many different ways.


Source: social media meme

In the 1980s, ADHD was conceived of mainly as a disorder of motor hyperactivity, as a disorder that only affects children, and that mainly affects boys. However, we now know that for some people with ADHD, their symptoms persist to adulthood, although the symptom presentation may change. We also now understand that ADHD has long been underdiagnosed in girls and women.
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The four-legged therapist: Why getting a pet to improve our mental health may be unethical

Every once in a while, I read news articles about the mental health benefits of owning pets. These articles always leave me feelings uncomfortable. They seem to ignore what appears to be obvious: these benefits are the side-effects of a positive, caring relationship with a member of another species, and getting a pet will not necessarily improve our mental health. One would hardly suggest that someone should make a friend, get married or have a child primarily, or even merely in order to improve their mental health.

Dog looking upset. Text reads After listening to her owner drone on for hours, Ginger Ginger suddenly realised she was NOT cut out to be an emotional support dog after all.

Source: social media meme

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How could paternalism ever be a good thing?

NobodyWantsToGoWhereIWantToLeadThem.png

Recently, as I was discussing with a friend of mine, the conversation brought us to the issue of paternalism. Taking the bad habit of playing the philosopher’s role, I said something like “You know, paternalism is actually not always wrong.” My friend reacted very surprised – as if I had said “You know, patriarchy is actually not always wrong.” And as it happens, for her, “paternalism” and “patriarchy” were closely linked – which I had never considered before. (more…)