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Author: Journal of Applied Philosophy

Economics / General / Liberty / Rights

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ARE NUDGES FAILING VULNERABLE POPULATIONS?

In this post, Viviana Ponce de León Solís discusses her article recently published in the Journal of Applied Philosophy on  how nudging interventions can have uneven effects on low-income individuals, potentially worsening inequalities.

Image by Reinhard Dietrich from Wikimedia Commons

Nudges can be powerful tools for influencing behavior, but their impact on vulnerable populations—especially low-socioeconomic status groups (SES)—remains a topic of debate. Research reveals three possible outcomes: these groups may respond more strongly, less strongly, or similarly to nudges compared to the general population. While the type of nudge—cognitive, affective, or behavioral—matters, the real key to success lies in the intervention’s design and its ability to address the unique barriers faced by the target audience. Without careful consideration, “one-size-fits-all” nudges risk deepening inequalities or stigmatizing vulnerable communities.

The rise of nudging: a subtle tool for big change

Nudging, a concept popularized by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, has become a go-to strategy for influencing behavior without restricting choice or altering incentives. By subtly reshaping the “choice architecture”—the context in which decisions are made—nudges aim to promote better outcomes in areas like health, finance, and sustainability. Major institutions like the World Bank, the OECD, and the United Nations have integrated nudging into their policies, recognizing its potential to drive social progress. But as its use expands, a critical question emerges: Are nudges truly equitable, or do they inadvertently favor certain groups over others?

Why one size doesn’t fit all

At its heart, nudging leverages insights from dual process theory and bounded rationality, acknowledging that people often rely on instinctive, automatic thinking rather than careful deliberation. However, this approach assumes a uniform response to nudges, overlooking the diverse ways different groups—especially those from low-SES backgrounds—interact with these interventions. For these individuals, factors like financial stress, cognitive load, and limited resources can significantly shape their responses.

The good, the bad, and the unexpected

Some studies reveal that emotionally driven nudges, such as those appealing to feelings of security or community, or behavior-based nudges like default options (e.g., automatic enrollment in energy-saving programs), often resonate strongly with low-SES groups. These interventions simplify decision-making, easing the mental burden for those facing daily financial pressures. In contrast, cognitively oriented nudges, which rely on information dissemination, tend to fall short. For example, a health app encouraging physical activity might fail to reach individuals with limited access to technology or lower digital literacy. Interestingly, some nudges show no significant difference in effectiveness across SES groups, suggesting that equitable outcomes are possible with the right approach.

Ethical dilemma: are nudges fair?

These varied responses raise important ethical questions. If some nudges disproportionately benefit the privileged, they risk widening existing inequalities. For low-SES individuals, barriers like limited resources or systemic inequities can make it harder to adopt these interventions. Moreover, nudges that focus on behavior change without addressing underlying systemic issues may inadvertently stigmatize vulnerable populations, portraying them as deficient or in need of correction. Even the low cost of nudges can backfire, as financial burdens may fall heaviest on those least able to afford them.

Designing nudges that work for everyone

To overcome these challenges, nudges must be carefully tailored to the realities of low-SES populations. Policymakers need to consider cognitive, material, and social barriers, ensuring interventions are accessible and effective for all. Expanding research to include diverse groups in real-world settings is essential, as it provides deeper insights into how nudges function across different contexts. By grounding nudges in evidence and designing them with inclusivity in mind, we can create interventions that truly empower the people they aim to help.

The future of nudging: inclusive and equitable design

The promise of nudging lies not in universal application but in thoughtful, context-aware design. By recognizing the diverse needs of different social groups and addressing the specific barriers faced by disadvantaged communities, we can craft nudges that are both effective and equitable. Longitudinal studies tracking the long-term impact of nudges, combined with qualitative research exploring the lived experiences of those affected, will be invaluable in refining these interventions.

Conclusion: nudging toward a fairer future

In conclusion, as nudging becomes a cornerstone of policy design, its success will depend on our ability to appreciate and address the diverse needs of all societal groups. By designing nudges with inclusivity and contextual awareness at their core, we can unlock their full potential as a force for positive, equitable change. With a commitment to fairness and evidence-based approaches, nudging can help build a future that is not only more effective but also more just for everyone.

Economics / General / Moral values / Work

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What’s so bad about workism?

In this post, Matthew Hammerton (Singapore Management University) discusses his article recently published in the Journal of Applied Philosophy on the phenomenon and value of people making work the primary source of meaning in their life.

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Some people center their life on work. They identify with their job and derive most of their life’s meaning from it. The writer Derek Thompson coined the term ‘workism’ to describe this phenomenon. Other people center their life on family (think of a stay-at-home parent who finds raising children deeply meaningful), a hobby, or something else entirely. Finally, some people don’t center their life on any single thing. Instead, they try to live a well-rounded life, drawing meaning and identity from a plurality of sources.

Are each of these lifestyles reasonable ways to live a life, or are some of them mistakes that lead to less fulfilling lives? In recent years, workism has come under fire and been dismissed as an especially poor life choice. In my article ‘What is wrong with workism?’ I challenge that view and defend workism as a viable way to live a good life. In case you are wondering, I am not a workist myself—I find meaning from a plurality of sources. Still, from a philosophical perspective, I don’t see what’s wrong with some people choosing to center their lives on work.  

Why balance isn’t everything

Many critics of workism reject it on the grounds that living a ‘balanced’ life is inherently better. However, this argument moves too quickly. If hedonism is true, then living an ‘unbalanced’ life is fine—as long as it brings you more pleasure. If preferentialism is true, then living an ‘unbalanced’ life is fine if it better satisfies your preferences.

To really press the objection, we have to appeal to Aristotelian perfectionism—the idea that the good life for humans consists of developing various goods that are fundamental to our nature. Furthermore, we have to appeal to the popular perfectionist idea that it is important to have a balanced mix of these goods. According to this view, we should avoid living a lopsided life that overemphasizes one good while neglecting others. Such a life, even if rich in total good, remains fundamentally incomplete.

There are several issues with this kind of argument against workism, but let me focus on one. Suppose the perfectionist is right: a well-rounded life is better for us. Still, it doesn’t follow that it’s a mistake to live an unbalanced life. That’s because life isn’t just about maximizing well-being. In addition to living well for ourselves, we also want our lives to be meaningful—significant, purposeful, and impactful.

But here’s the thing: as I’ve argued elsewhere, balance doesn’t matter when it comes to meaning. Just look at some of the most meaningful human lives—Albert Einstein, Frida Kahlo, Mother Tersea, Nelson Mandela. These weren’t well-rounded lives. They were lopsided. They prioritized a single cause or form of excellence in order to achieve great things. We might call these figures ‘workists with a noble cause’. This suggests that meaning in life is simply about having the biggest positive impact you can on the world, which doesn’t require living a well-rounded life.

The upshot is that workism can be a reasonable choice for those seeking meaning. If perfectionism is right, then workists may lose some well-being by opting for an ‘unbalanced’ life. However, this loss can be offset by the meaning their lives gain.  

Too many eggs in one basket

Another common objection to workism is that it’s risky. If your life is centered on work then a major setback—a layoff, burnout, failure—can leave you emotionally disoriented and lacking purpose. A well-rounded life, in contrast, offers more fallback options.

This is a fair point. But it’s often overstated. The critique assumes a comparison between the well-rounded life and a cartoonish version of workism, where work is the only thing that matters. And sure, in that extreme, workism looks dangerous. But in real life, that version is rare. Humans are social creatures. Most people—even those who center their lives on work—still value relationships, hobbies, and causes beyond the office.

So the more realistic comparison is between the well-rounded life and moderate workism—where work is the main source of meaning, but not the only one. In this more grounded scenario, the difference in emotional resilience isn’t that stark. Yes, well-rounded folks may have stronger relationships and more hobbies to fall back on. But moderate workists usually have those too—just not to the same degree. And that difference isn’t necessarily decisive.

If choosing a life of moderate workism allows you to make a greater positive impact on the world, then that gain in meaning might be worth the small extra risk you take on.

There’s no one-size-fits-all good life

Elsewhere, I’ve considered other objections to workism. What is interesting about the two we’ve discussed is that they don’t just apply to work—they apply to any life centered on one thing: family, art, activism, sport, you name it. They all push us toward the ideal of a well-rounded life.

I agree that there is much to recommend in such a life. However, we shouldn’t assume that this makes it ideal for everyone. People are different. Some people have dispositions, talents, preferences, or life circumstances that make them suited to a narrowly focused life. Others thrive on variety. The key is recognizing that there are many ways to live well. Rather than pushing a single ideal, we should embrace pluralism about the good life.

Children / Climate / Democracy / Environment / General / Social justice

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Innocence and Agency: The ethics of child protests

In this post, Tim Fowler (University of Bristol) discusses his recently published article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy in which he explores whether children can be deemed as competent to engage in political activism.

The Fridays for Future or ‘Climate Strikes’ have been a striking feature of political action on climate change. Most associated with Greta Thunberg, these actions reveal the power of children to intervene effectively in political spaces. In doing so, they raise ethical, political, and sociological questions. In my paper I focus on two: first, whether recognizing children’s right to protest should affect the age thresholds for other activities, especially voting; and second, the impact on the child protesters themselves.

I’ve long been interested in questions about children and childhood, partly because children don’t always ‘fit’ within liberal frameworks. Liberalism, as the ideology of the Enlightenment and modern world, emphasizes autonomous, independent agents. Our democratic practices presume people who can make and bear the consequences of their choices. Children are excluded from voting, driving, drinking, etc., on the grounds that they lack such capacities. Yet Greta Thunberg and others challenge this through the commitment, agency, and skill the strikes demand. It’s inappropriate to dismiss their actions as merely ‘childish’ or of no value.

For those committed to consistency in how we distinguish adults from children, two options seem to follow: either deny the competence of child protesters and ignore them, or recognize their competence and lower the voting age. But if we accept the latter, consistency might also suggest lowering the drinking or sexual consent age. Instead, I propose a more piecemeal approach, recognizing different kinds of competence. Voting should involve weighing complex national issues — something children, on the whole, may lack capacity for — even if they can express thoughtful views on specific topics.

The second question is whether striking is good for children. While this depends on individual cases, we can ask more broadly whether political engagement benefits children. I argue that there is a cost, as it takes away a period of life when one might be innocent of the world’s burdens — a quality long seen, though sometimes controversially, as central to childhood. The philosophical concept of the intrinsic goods of childhood — those things good in themselves about being a child — is useful here. Thinkers like Samantha Brennan, Anca Gheaus, and Colin McLeod have emphasized childhood’s value in its own right, with McLeod highlighting innocence as part of what makes childhood special.

From this perspective, the rise of eco-anxiety — children’s deep worry about climate change, and now, wars like Ukraine and Gaza — is profoundly regrettable. Political anxiety is troubling for anyone, but especially for children, as it undermines goods of childhood that cannot be reclaimed. Yet while innocence is important, insisting on it too strongly ignores that many children are already exposed to politics. Given this, preventing them from acting on their concerns is unfair, and activism may be a psychologically healthy response to their anxieties. As I argue in the paper, the worst situation is one where children are exposed to politics but forbidden to act.

This leads to an ambivalent conclusion. On one hand, I argue that society can grant children the right to protest without granting them the right to vote; the issue of consistency is overstated. Different institutions and practices have good reasons for drawing the child/adult line differently. For many children, protesting is a positive act — both as a means of pursuing political change and as a way to feel agency. Yet we should also regret that children feel the need to protest at all, since it signals that we, as adults, have let them down and that they have lost something of real significance.

Economics / General / Governance / Health / Liberty

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What I Really, Really Want: Why True Preferences Matter for Nudging

In this post, Bart Engelen (Tilburg University) and Viktor Ivanković (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb) discuss their recently published article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy, where they explore what it means to have ‘true preferences’ and how this affects our understanding of autonomy and nudging.

Failing to do what we really, really want seems all-too familiar in everyday life. You might want to lead a healthier lifestyle or aspire to a career in a girl band but turn out to be too sluggish to go for a run or practice your singing and dancing skills. If you really are committed to those aims, these are clear instances where you fail to satisfy your ‘true preferences’.

Laziness and akrasia

So, what is it that you really, really want? And why does it matter whether or not others can know your deepest desires? In our new article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy, we argue why some of your preferences are truer than others and why policy-makers can and should steer you in the direction of these preferences by nudging you when you veer off course.

Image from DHE-Art

True preferences, we contend, are real and should be taken seriously, by ourselves, by philosophers and by policy-makers. They are more fundamental and stable than our more superficial, impulsive and flimsy preferences. They also have special status and carry special normative weight. We care about them; it really matters to us whether or not we succeed in realizing what we set out to do, whether this is akin to a New Year’s resolution or something more vital to our central life plans.

All of this might sound rather obvious. Who would deny this? Oddly enough, more than a few (behavioral) economists do. In our article, we discuss and respond to three types of objections that they raise against true preferences. First, true preferences have been claimed not to exist. Even when preferences are incoherent, the objection goes, there is no indication as to why some preferences might be meaningfully “truer” than others.

And even if there are true preferences, a second objection states, they remain unknowable to others, and particularly to meddlesome governments. Of the many, changing and often incoherent preferences, how can one possibly single out those that are somehow true or special? How can an outsider know whether you suffer from procrastination or simply prefer not to chase after a life of fame?

Third, true preferences might simply lack normative weight and the fact that someone is veering of course might not justify governmental interference. Governments then, have no business promoting true preferences. Surely, policy-makers shouldn’t make it their business to help you become the next Mel B or Posh Spice, even if that is your deepest desire.

Image from Rawpixel.com

True preferences

In the article, we attend to these objections. True preferences, we show, are quite essential to how we understand core concepts of moral philosophy, like autonomy and authenticity. We point to several plausible ways of understanding true preferences developed by philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt (higher-order preferences), Bernard Williams (authentic preferences), Tyler DesRoches (values-based preferences) and Mark Fabian and Malte Dold (agentic preferences). All of these understandings establish a connection between true preferences and the core concepts of moral philosophy.

All of these philosophers claim that some of our preferences are (more) special (than other preferences), as they express (more) closely who we are. They make up the kind of person we consider ourselves to be or that we aspire to become. Those who deny that true preferences exist or have special normative weight, we argue, undermine our ability to make sense of autonomy and authenticity. When people fail to act on their commitments, they are not leading the life they want to live. We need a notion of ‘true preferences’ to capture the fundamental thought that some of our preferences are more ‘ours’ and that others are more ‘alien’ to us.

Policy implications

So what does this mean for policy-makers? Knowing what you really, really want might be nice for yourself, your partner and your friends but should politicians and policy-makers be in the business of figuring out your deepest desires? In the article, we defend the case for ‘paternalistic nudges’ that promote true preferences. Policy-makers, in our view, can and should nudge citizens when they predictably veer off course and fail to satisfy their own true preferences.

So far, nudge advocates have mostly assumed what people’s true preferences might be. This has been heavily criticized as an objectionable kind of paternalism because it supposedly ends up with policy-makers imposing their values on citizens. Instead of really catering to people’s true preferences, policy-makers will nudge citizens in directions that the policy-makers regard as beneficial, be it health, wealth, or some other aspect of wellbeing. Say, people can be nudged into doing more regular check-ups, eat healthier food, or drive safely, all things that they surely prefer…or do they? How can policy-makers hope to find this out? Economists are all too keen to point out knowledge problems in government operations.

And while they make some important points, the knowledge problem for true preferences represents a challenge to be overcome, not a cause for defeatism. We are not helpless in its wake. It is perfectly possible to identify scenarios in which people predictably form false beliefs, exercise poor evaluative judgments or suffer from incompetence. We can use generalizations and statistical evidence for what contributes to a healthy and financially stable life and we can use surveys and other scientific methodologies to gauge people’s desires.

Importantly, we can do all of this while making absolutely sure that dissenters can go their separate ways. This is the advantage of nudges. They can help people get things right (when they steer them in the direction of a true preference), while preserving their freedom to resist (if they steer in the wrong direction). So, even if it turns out that you really prefer to watch rather than be a Spice Girl, you won’t be forced in either direction.

Academia / Distribution / General / Health / Moral values / Technology

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Just do(pe) it? Why the academic project is at risk from proposals to pharmacologically enhance researchers.

In this post, Heidi Matisonn (University of Cape Town) and Jacek Brzozowski (University of KwaZulu-Natal) discuss their recently published article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy in which they explore the justifiability and potential risks of cognitive enhancement in academia.

Image created with ChatGPT.

The human desire to enhance our cognitive abilities, to push the boundaries of intelligence through education, tools, and technology has a long history. Fifteen years ago, confronted by the possibility that a ‘morally corrupt’ minority could misuse cognitive gains to catastrophic effect, Persson and Savulescu proposed that research into cognitive enhancement should be halted unless accompanied by advancements in moral enhancement.

In response to this, and following on from Harris’ worries about the mass suffering that could result from delaying cognitive enhancement until moral enhancement could catch up, in 2023, Gordon and Ragonese offered what they termed a ‘practical approach’ to cognitive enhancement research in which they advocated for targeted cognitive enhancement —specifically for researchers working on moral enhancement.

Our recent article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy suggests that while both sets of authors are correct in their concerns about the significant risks related to cognitive enhancement outrunning moral enhancement, their focus on the ‘extremes’ neglects some more practical consequences that a general acceptance of cognitive enhancement may bring — not least of which relate to the academic project itself.

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General / Health / Moral values

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Is there anything wrong with allowing oneself to feel liked by a chatbot?

In this post, Emilia Kaczmarek (University of Warsaw) discusses her recently published article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy in which she explores the ethical implications of self-deception in emotional relationships of humans with AI entities.

Photo: Free to use by Mateusz Haberny.

The popularity of AI girlfriend apps is growing. Unlike multi-purpose AI such as ChatGPT, companion chatbots are designed to build relationships. They respond to social, emotional or erotic needs of their users. Numerous studies indicate that humans are capable of forming emotional relationships with AI, partly due to our tendency to anthropomorphize it.

The debate on the ethical aspects of human-AI emotional relations is multi-threaded. In my recent article, I focus only on one topic: the problem of self-deception. I want to explore whether there is anything wrong with allowing oneself to feel liked by a chatbot.

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Children / Climate / Duties / Environment / General

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Why it can be OK to have kids in the climate emergency

In this post, Elizabeth Cripps (University of Edinburgh) discusses her new article published in the Journal of Applied Philosophy, in which she explores whether it is justifiable to have children despite the carbon footprint it creates.

Credit: Andrea Thomson Photography.

In the US, having a child has a carbon price tag of 7 tonnes a year. In France, it’s 1.4 tonnes. Going vegan saves only 0.4 tonnes yearly, living car free 2.4 tonnes, and avoiding a Transatlantic flight 1.6 tonnes.

For those of us who have or want kids, this is an uncomfortable fact. We know we should pursue climate justice, including by cutting our own carbon impact. Does it follow that someone living an affluent life in a country like the UK or the US should stay childless?

Not necessarily. What’s more, by putting this argument under pressure, we learn some important lessons for moral philosophers. We need to talk more about individual sacrifice in the face of global emergencies. In so doing, we must engage carefully with sociological and psychological scholarship and attend to the insights of demographic groups who have experienced injustice.

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Gender / General / Moral values

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Non-monogamy and the “Black Marriage Problem”

In this discussion post, Justin Clardy (he/they; Santa Clara University) introduces their article recently published in the Journal of Applied Philosophy on polyamory and a defense for minimal marriage among the Black population in the USA.

The short synopsis of the article is accompanied by an asynchronous conversation among Anika Simpson (Howard) Faith Charmagne, Luke Brunning (Leeds) and Nannearl Brown (PAGES TRG) where they will engage with the article in terms of its academic and practical implications for the Black population in the US.

Created with Bing AI Image Generator (2024).

Synopsis by Justin Clardy

The Black marriage problem—or the fact that “Black folks just aren’t getting or staying married like they used to”—has been a concern for Black writers. This problem is concerning because just less than 60 years ago, Black marriages rates were thought to be one of the zeniths of the Civil Rights Movement.

In 2022, Ralph Richard Banks appeared in the New York Post doubling down on his 2011 suggestion that in order to solve the Black marriage problem, Black women should consider marrying more white men. What’s striking about Banks’ suggestion is not just that it does not take endogamy as seriously as it should, it also does not take non-monogamy among Black folks as seriously as it should either. What possibilities would expanding legal marriage to include plural marriages offer for the same populations of unmarried Black folks that Black writers believe to be driving the Black marriage crisis? This is one of the questions that I explore in a recent article called “Polyamory in Black.”

Historical records in the U.S. tell stories of non-monogamous relationships dating back to the antebellum period. Some of these relationships were, of course, forged by the pernicious design of the domestic slave trade. Other Black non-monogamous intimate relationships, however, were chosen. In her book, Black Women Black Love: America’s War on African American Marriage, Dianne Stewart writes about Dorcas Cooper who was content to remain in a polygamous marriage after arriving on a plantation to find her husband married to a second woman. When Cooper recognized how well her husband’s second wife, Jenny, took care of Cooper’s kids, historical record even shows a deep fondness of Jenny from Cooper as she would not “let anybody say anything against [Jenny].” Historical record also during Reconstruction, shows Freedmen’s Bureau agents disregarding non-monogamous intimacies in the years following the Civil War by breaking up Black non-monogamous families as one agent recounted “Whenever a negro appears before me with 2 or 3 wives…I marry him to the woman who has the greatest number of helpless children who would otherwise become a charge on the bureau.” Importantly, then just as now, marriage was tethered to a bundle of rights and entitlements that had material consequences, such as the denial of Civil War pensions, on Black individuals and families who the institution forbade.

Despite (or, perhaps because of) the presence of Black non-monogamies, both in the antebellum and Reconstruction periods, anti-non-monogamous propaganda routinely portrayed non-monogamists as Black or barbaric in order to convey messages of chaos, foreigners, and despotism. As I show in an article published in the Journal of Applied Philosophy, some of these anti-black anti-non-monogamous impressions were published in media outlets following the Reynolds v United States decision handed down by the Supreme Court. Even the Court’s official opinion white engagement with non-monogamy was said to produce a “peculiar race” as the practice was thought natural and common among Asiatic and African peoples but foreign to whites.

Insofar as the Reynolds opinion remains one of the highest opinions handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court on plural marriage, present day marriage law has disproportionately harmful consequences on the growing population of Black polyamorists in the U.S.—both socially and materially. For example, non-monogamists are more likely than their monogamist counterparts to have their relationship(s) subjected to social scrutiny and are less likely than their monogamous counterparts to have their relationships cohere with zoning laws forbidding the number of “unrelated” people living in the same household. The ongoing ban against plural marriages in the U.S. generate interesting questions about what it might take to end non-monogamous oppression and enact measures to repair the harms done by legal marriage on Black non-monogamists. And, as I argue in “Polyamory in Black” I think that a compelling rationale can be offered for thinking about Black reparations along these lines.

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Distribution / Economics / General / Moral values / Work

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Should We Mourn the Loss of Work?

In this post, Caleb Althorpe (Trinity College Dublin) and Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (Western University) discuss their new open access article published in the Journal of Applied Philosophy, in which they discuss the moral goods and bads of a future without work.

Photo by Possessed Photography on Unsplash

It is an increasingly held view that technological advancement is going to bring about a ‘post-work’ future because recent technologies in things like artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning have the potential to replace not just complex physical tasks but also complex mental ones. In a world where robots are beginning to perform surgeries independently and where AI can perform better than professional human lawyers, it does not seem absurd to predict that at some point in the next few centuries productive human labour could be redundant.

In our recent paper, we grant this prediction and ask: would a post-work future be a good thing? Some people think that a post-work world would be a kind of utopia (‘a world free from toil? Sign me up!’). But because there is a range of nonpecuniary benefits affiliated with work, then a post-work future might be problematic.

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Animals / Duties / General / Moral values / War

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If animals have rights, why not bomb slaughterhouses?

In this post, Nico Müller (U. of Basel) and Friderike Spang (U. of Lausanne) discuss their new article published in the Journal of Applied Philosophy, in which they look at the relation between animal rights and violent forms of activism. They argue that violent activism frequently backfires, doing more harm than good to the animal rights cause.

Created with DALL.E (2024)

In 2022 alone, some ten billion land animals were killed in US slaughterhouses. That’s ten billion violations of moral rights, at least if many philosophers since the 1960s (and some before that) have got it right. If the victims were human, most of us would condone the use of violence, even lethal violence, in their defense. So regardless of whether you agree with the values of the animal rights movement, you may wonder: Why isn’t this movement much more violent? It seems like it should be, on its own terms.

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