Free as a Bird?

We often use visual representations and metaphors involving animals to represent human freedom. Consider, for instance, “It’s time to spread to your wings”, “I couldn’t persuade her to do otherwise. It was like trying to hold back wild horses”, “She’s a bit of a lone wolf”, “A lion does not concern himself with the opinion of sheep”. Conversely, the caged animal often serves as a symbol of human suffering, imprisonment, and oppression.

Yet many philosophers do not think animals have a genuine interest in freedom. For these thinkers, freedom only matters for nonhuman animals insofar as it contributes to their welfare. On such a view, there is nothing wrong with enslaving – if it can be called that – a nonhuman animal provided we can keep them healthy and happy. By contrast, enslaving a human is never acceptable, no matter how happy you can make them. This is because humans (and perhaps a few of the so-called higher animals) have a unique noninstrumental interest in freedom, which means that freedom matters for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else.

What is it about humans that might be considered to ground this unique interest in freedom? Typically, philosophers argue that humans (by which they mean cognitively mature, unimpaired humans) have a distinctive interest in freedom because of our capacity to form and live in accordance with a conception of the good. Conceptions of the good are essentially our personal views about what gives life its meaning and are comprised of a more or less complete system of values. One might, for instance, have a conception of the good organised around a particular religious doctrine such as Catholicism or Hinduism; a philosophical doctrine such as utilitarianism or deep ecology; or indeed, something much less well-defined and unsystematic, like a loose collection of interests in, say, friendship, cookery, and music. Whatever your view about the good life, as a creature who can form and follow a conception of the good, justice requires that you be free to pursue a life of your own choosing.

The Noninstrumental Value of Human Freedom

Importantly, on this view, human freedom does not have only instrumental value – it is not valuable simply because of the good things it brings about. We can illustrate this thought more clearly by considering two dimensions of personal freedom that we typically value.

First, it is widely believed that we should be free to choose things for ourselves even when doing so carries a risk that things may go badly for us because we value living a life of our own. For example, I should be free to drink alcohol, eat an abundance of fried foods, befriend morally dubious characters, get a face tattoo, date serial cheaters, take up extreme sports, and pursue a career in academia. These things may harm me, but whatever the consequences, the fact that it was my choice means it’s my life. The freedom to choose for myself has value irrespective of the consequences because it enables me to live a life of my own.

Second, and relatedly, we typically think that something important would be lost if we were merely passive spectators to our lives, and that life would be less worthwhile if our successes were not our own but rather delivered to us by others. This suggests that being the authors of our lives – being actively engaged in our pursuits and activities – is valuable irrespective of whether someone else could bring about the same benefits for us.

Notably, the two dimensions of personal freedom sketched above have little to do with our ability to form conceptions of the good and more to do with our interest in having control over, and being actively engaged in, the particulars of daily life. This gives us strong reason to doubt that the noninstrumental value of freedom is unique to human beings.

Animal Welfare Matters, But So Does Freedom

All sentient creatures—those capable of experiencing pain and pleasure—have preferences and desires that they seek to fulfil. Additionally, each sentient being experiences the world uniquely and individually. Each of us, human or otherwise, must endure the world from our own embodied standpoint, which means that we have a special interest in being able to exert control over our experiences, actions, and environment.  

One might agree with me but still deny that animals have a noninstrumental interest in freedom. In response, I want to make two observations (analogous to those sketched above) in support of the noninstrumental value of freedom for sentient nonhuman animals.

First, while welfare matters, it is a mistake to think that it is the only thing that matters to other animals. When animals are competent decision-makers (they understand the world around them and can make appropriate decisions based on their knowledge), they have an interest in being free from interference even when freedom comes with associated risks. For example, wild sentient animals have an interest in being free – and not confined by us – even when being free comes with the risk of not securing enough food, contracting a disease, or being killed by another animal. While some wild animals might experience less harm under our constant care (a claim that is hard to have confidence in), the idea that we have the natural authority to limit their freedom looks unjustifiable from the animal’s point of view. It is for them to decide how their lives unfold, not us.

Second, there is a natural tendency for all agents to seek control over their experiences, coupled with a general aversion to passivity, which suggests that any sentient animal would prefer to achieve their goals on their own rather than have them satisfied by external means, such as human intervention. As Tom Regan writes in The Case for Animal Rights (2004, p. 92),

“A captive wolf who is regularly fed by his keeper doubtless has his desire for food satisfied. But a wolf who must exert some effort and ingenuity to satisfy his desire for food not only satisfies his desire for food [… but] also finds satisfaction, in collaboration with other members of his pack, in doing what needs to be done to have his desire for food satisfied.”

This supports the idea that it’s not just humans for whom being actively engaged in one’s life matters.

Evaluating Animal Captivity

If freedom has noninstrumental value for nonhuman animals this raises serious questions about the legitimacy of practices that necessarily involve constraining animals’ agency such as farming animals, keeping them in zoos, using them as research subjects, and keeping them as pets. What right do we have to infringe animals’ interests in freedom in these ways? Can we justify continued captivity and the maintenance of institutions that necessarily confine, constrain, and limit animals’ freedom?

Crucially, ethical evaluations of our current practices that only consider their welfare implications for animals are incomplete. When we’re thinking about how animals deserve to be treated by us, we should think not just of their interest in not suffering but their interest in freedom.