Justice Everywhere

a blog about justice in public affairs

Category: Academia (Page 1 of 5)

Universities and Democratic Legitimacy (Part 2)

In part 1 of this post I outlined an account of the mainstream liberal view about academic freedom, free speech, and their overlapping democratic purposes. According to this account the university should have an academic zone, protected by academic freedom, and aimed at furthering democratic competence, and it should also have a free speech zone, aimed at supporting democratic legitimation.

I think there’s a problem with this picture. Roughly, what goes on in the academic zone is compromised by what goes on in the free speech zone. The intellectual aims that the university is meant to serve, with a view to furthering our democratic competence, can be undermined by the kind of free speech culture that takes root in universities. This undermining is most evident when it comes to the educative arm of the university’s purposes. If every campus-dweller’s free speech is protected similarly to the scholar’s academic freedom, then the typical student’s experience of university – particularly in fields that intersect with social politics: history, law, philosophy, economics, public policy, psychology, social science, education, and modern languages – can become something more like a pseudo-educative pageant, rather than a regimented, epistemically salutary, educational experience. If this sounds overegged, remember that nearly every university today self-consciously markets itself as a place where students can experience not just an education, but a total socialisation experience. And the people who shape that socialisation experience aren’t just scholars with a sense of accountability to the norms and purposes that govern their disciplines. The campus experience is shaped by bottom-line-obsessed managers, enterprising student leaders, activists – of many stripes, good and bad – and opportunistic trolls, cynically cashing in on the whole scene.

This isn’t a knock on free speech. Free speech is integral to the vitality and legitimacy of democracy. That remains true and important. But those who worry that there isn’t enough free speech at universities have it almost back-to-front. Universities are overwhelmed by the discursive free-for-all that characterises campus life. The university should be a place where intellectual discipline reigns above all. Yes, the scholar is meant to be free from top-down ideological constraints. But what she is expected to do, with that freedom, is oversee an intellectually disciplined educative program. To say, as John Dewey once did, that the university should be an experiment station, isn’t to say that it should be a marketplace of ideas. To efface that distinction is to misunderstand the nature of both experiments and markets. And the cost of that misunderstanding is an erosion of the pedagogical culture that underpins (one half of) the university’s very reason for being.

But what about research? Surely the activities of researchers are benefited by their academic departments being nested in campuses that embrace free speech? Maybe. But there are considerations that weigh on both sides of the equation. Granted, in societies where there is coercive, state-backed ideological conformity, academic researchers are fundamentally hobbled. To suggest otherwise would be an insult to those trying to carry out the scholarly vocation under such regimes. And by the same token, in societies where there isn’t coercive ideological conformity, it’s obviously much easier for researchers to ply their trade. But the question is whether academic research is further assisted by housing researchers in institutions that embrace a content-neutral free speech ethos – where the worth of ideas is decided by marketplace mechanisms, instead of disciplinary expertise. Here’s one reason to think it isn’t. In a marketplace of ideas, people don’t buy the true ideas; they buy the ideas they prefer. Markets don’t magically sift truths from falsehoods, any more than they magically ensure the popularity of good-value-for-money products over crappy ones. When they’re functioning properly, markets facilitate an efficient allocation of things in line with people’s preferences. And as James Cox and Alvin Goldman persuasively argue, that’s just as true in a marketplace of ideas as in any other marketplace [1]. (Their analysis has been dismayingly vindicated by the growth of social media-based echo chambers.)

Again, none of this is to deny that scholarly research must be free from ideological constraints. That’s a crucial part of what the specialised principles and institutions of academic freedom are for. But a campus free speech culture doesn’t just unbuckle the ideological constraints. It also unbuckles the intellectual constraints that academic disciplines are meant to impose – and which, for the sake of university’s constitutive purposes, they must impose.

The points I’m driving at, then, are – first – that academic freedom and free speech aren’t identical; they impose different demands; and – second – that we can have academic freedom without having universities governed by a free speech ethos. (And indeed, that is basically what some higher education systems did have, during the brief period between the ascent of the Humboldtian model of the university, in the interwar period, until the 1960s and 1970s, when this model rapidly evolved towards a modified civil libertarian model.) In a university sector that cherishes academic freedom, but which adopts a more cautious, measured, balancing approach to free speech, we still have an institution that serves a vital role in democracy. The university’s core purpose, thus conceived, is to strengthen democratic competence. The work of democratic legitimation can be delegated to other discursive arenas. A reluctance to delegate may be well-meaning, but it runs the risk of furthering our society’s (apparently mushrooming) democratic incompetence.

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[1] Alvin I. Goldman and James C. Cox (1996), “Speech, truth, and the free market for ideas”, Legal Theory 2 (1), pp. 1-32.

Universities and Democratic Legitimacy (Part 1)

Free speech is vital to democracy. Alexander Meiklejohn offered a powerful defense of this idea in the mid-20th century, and since then it has gravitated towards centre stage in free speech discourse. The modern academic defenders of this view — people like Robert Post, Eric Heinze, and Ronald Dworkin — typically say that free speech isn’t just important for the health of a democracy, but that it’s also a necessary condition for democratic legitimacy. In a free society people are unafraid to broadcast their ethical convictions in public. There is a free press, an arts sector untouched by state censorship, and a cherished liberty for all to mock and criticise our leaders. The democratic government’s authority is legitimised partly through its upholding these freedoms.

But where does academic freedom fit into this picture? And what is the university’s role in ensuring the vitality and legitimacy of democratic society? By academic freedom I mean the special freedom for academics to teach, research, and write as they see fit, insulated from the threat of punishment for saying things that others think false, unjust, or offensive. Is this special sub-category of communicative liberty simply an extension of free speech, as far its democratic significance is concerned?

Robert Post, who I mentioned above, has done more than any scholar in the last generation to develop our understanding of the foundations of academic freedom. And his answer to this question about the relation between academic freedom and democracy is a surprising one. [1] The teaching and research work that define the scholarly vocation – the activities that the modern, disciplinary university was designed to facilitate – do not directly serve democratic legitimacy. They serve an ideal that complements democratic legitimacy, but which is importantly distinct from it. Academic teaching and research further our democratic competence. They provide a crucial contribution to society’s collective capacity to make intelligent, well-informed judgements about the matters of public concern which government must address.

If the people are to rule themselves capably, then they need to not be ignoramuses or chauvinists. They need to remember their history. They need to understand science and technology, and continue expanding its horizons. They need their judgement to be conditioned by a philosophical sense of the complexity in all things, and by a social scientific curiosity about how people’s lives and customs really work. And they need educators in academically-grounded professional vocations – like medicine, law, engineering, and economics – to have a scholarly sense of rigour concerning their spheres of expertise. Of course no-one among us needs to try realise all of these ideals under his or her own steam. But if we as a people are to rule ourselves well, then collectively we do need to realise all of them. The job of universities, and the teaching and research they deliver, is to further democratic competence, thus characterised. And principles of academic freedom identify the protections that should be given to universities and individual academics to help them achieve this.

I think this is the best account of the justificatory foundations of academic freedom. But it isn’t obvious how we square it with the view – which has been mainstream progressive opinion for half a century – that universities should also be bastions of free speech. Many people believe that the university is more than the institutionalised knowledge-engine envisioned by the German and American architects of modern higher education. The university isn’t exclusively about scholarly research and education. It is also a site for rowdier, messier, and more wide-open discursive activities. It’s like a miniaturised version of the public sphere at large; the place where we stage an ongoing kind of democratic happening, involving (among other things) political activism, popular debate, and creative experimentation.

If that view is correct, then it would be a mistake to think of universities as merely serving the ideal of democratic competence. They also serve the ideal of democratic legitimation. We can distinguish – as do Howard Gillman and Erwin Chemerinsky [2] – two different communicative zones in universities, corresponding to the service of these complementary ideals. Teaching and research take place in the academic zone; they are protected by academic freedom, and they further society’s democratic competence. But then there is also a free speech zone – where extra-curricular debates and student society events happen, where artists, preachers, anarchist drop-outs, and militant activists congregate and argue – and the communication that takes place there serves the complementary purpose of democratic legitimation.

In a democratic society, then, according to this view, the university’s mission is to play host to the important communicative activities that transpire in these two complementary discursive zones. This is an appealing picture. But in part 2 of this post, on Wednesday, I’ll argue that we should reject it.

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[1] See Robert C. Post (2009), Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom: A First Amendment Jurisprudence for the Modern State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012); see also Matthew W. Finkin and Robert C. Post (2009), For the Common Good: Principles of American Academic Freedom (New Haven: Yale University Press).

[2] Erwin Chemerinsky and Howard Gillman (2017), Free Speech on Campus (New Haven: Yale University Press).

What would it take to turn Facebook into a democracy?

by Severin Engelmann and Lisa Herzog*

When the relation between “Facebook” and “democracy” is discussed, the question usually is: what impact does Facebook – as it exists today – have on democratic processes? While this is an urgent and important question, one can also raise a different one: what would it mean to turn Facebook into a democracy, i.e. to govern it democratically? What challenges of institutional design would have to be met for developing meaningful democratic governance structures for Facebook?

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Justice and “Contingent Faculty”

In this post, Matthew Adams addresses the question: What are the responsibilities of university faculty who have permanent positions to those who have contingent (or non-permanent) positions, if any? 

In the United States almost three quarters of American college-level teachers/researchers are “contingent faculty.” Contingent faculty is an umbrella term for part- and full-time non-tenure-track positions. These include adjuncts, non-tenure track instructors, graduate teaching assistants, part-time lecturers*, etc. Not all faculty who are classified as contingent faculty are equally disadvantaged. For instance, some non-tenure track instructors—in contrast to almost all adjuncts—have health insurance. However, one thing is clear: few (if any) academics would choose to be part of the contingent rather than permanent faculty, at least after they have completed their graduate studies and postdocs.

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Recent Vacancies in Political Theory/Philosophy/Ethics

Lecturer in Political Theory (Permanent), University of Essex (closing imminently)

Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy (Value Theory), Bowdoin College, Brunswick (closing imminently)

Postdoctoral Research Fellowship in Information Ethics/Applied Ethics, The Ethics Institute and Department of Philosophy, Northeastern University, Boston (closing imminently)

Postgraduate Scholarships in Philosophy (MA and MPhil), University of Warwick (closing imminently)

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Call for Papers: Stanford Junior Scholars Workshop

Here is a call for funded (!) workshop for junior scholars at Stanford’s Center for Ethics in Society:

https://ethicsinsociety.stanford.edu/research-outreach/junior-scholars-workshop

An excerpt from the Call: “We are especially interested in scholarship in what might be called “interdisciplinary ethics.” Normative scholarship focused on issues like immigration, climate change, global poverty, and the governance of new technologies can benefit from engagement with the social sciences, law, engineering, and life sciences. We especially encourage submissions that bring relevant empirically-oriented scholarship to bear on normative questions and analysis.”

Very much in the spirit of this blog!

“Dumbed down for the masses”? Public philosophy in different keys, and why it matters for justice

When one makes one first steps into public philosophy, one quickly encounters a challenge: as academic philosophers, we are used to writing in a slow, careful, sort-of-boring-but-at-least-precise way: to hedge our claims, to qualify the scope of our theses, etc. For public philosophy, editors want the opposite: brief, succinct sentences, never mind a bit of exaggeration and a polemical tone. And often, they request more: “We really need a concrete example here.” “This is too abstract, we’ve taken the liberty of rewriting it a bit.”  “Can you please do a photo session, for a nice picture?” For many of us, these things feel a bit awkward. Different people draw the line in different places – but it seems unavoidable to play this game, at least up to a point, if you want to reach a broader audience. And as I will argue, there is a matter of justice at stake here.

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5th Annual Conference of the Centre for the Study of Global Ethics

The Call for Papers for the 5th Annual Conference of the Centre for the Study of Global Ethics (30-31 May 2019, Birmingham) is now open. We welcome abstract submissions on the Conference’s theme Bodies and Embodiment as well as other topics in global ethics. For more information, please see below or visit the conference website.

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Philosophical experiment about inequality

A cross-post with crooked timber  – written with Ingrid Robeyns.

Political philosophers often engage in thought experiments, which involve putting hypothetical persons in hypothetical scenario’s. However, it is often challenging to find ways to involve real, non-hypothetical, people with the questions we are dealing with, aside from the more traditional ways to engage in outreach such as debates and opinion pieces.  On the evening of Friday the 5th of October, the Fair Limits team – which studies the plausibility of upper limits in the distribution of economic and ecological resources – attempted a new way to engage the public by making use of a participatory “veil-of-ignorance” thought experiment.

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Who Cares: Emotional Labour in Academia

As I am finishing yet another application for a position with limited chances of success (I did my statistics homework), I am reminding myself again that I shouldn’t get too emotionally invested: I shouldn’t picture myself with this specific position in this particular place just yet. I should take a potential ‘No’ lightly as a sportive challenge and not see it as a fundamental rejection of my work and my value as a member of the academic community. I know all of that. But it is emotionally exhausting. It requires energy and time to deal with the anxieties and insecurities this process brings up. And, importantly, it often requires the support and care of people that are close to me.

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