What I Really, Really Want: Why True Preferences Matter for Nudging

In this post, Bart Engelen (Tilburg University) and Viktor Ivanković (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb) discuss their recently published article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy, where they explore what it means to have ‘true preferences’ and how this affects our understanding of autonomy and nudging.

True preferences, we contend, are real and should be taken seriously, by ourselves, by philosophers and by policy-makers. They are more fundamental and stable than our more superficial, impulsive and flimsy preferences. They also have special status and carry special normative weight. We care about them; it really matters to us whether or not we succeed in realizing what we set out to do, whether this is akin to a New Year’s resolution or something more vital to our central life plans.

All of this might sound rather obvious. Who would deny this? Oddly enough, more than a few (behavioral) economists do. In our article, we discuss and respond to three types of objections that they raise against true preferences. First, true preferences have been claimed not to exist. Even when preferences are incoherent, the objection goes, there is no indication as to why some preferences might be meaningfully “truer” than others.

And even if there are true preferences, a second objection states, they remain unknowable to others, and particularly to meddlesome governments. Of the many, changing and often incoherent preferences, how can one possibly single out those that are somehow true or special? How can an outsider know whether you suffer from procrastination or simply prefer not to chase after a life of fame?

Third, true preferences might simply lack normative weight and the fact that someone is veering of course might not justify governmental interference. Governments then, have no business promoting true preferences. Surely, policy-makers shouldn’t make it their business to help you become the next Mel B or Posh Spice, even if that is your deepest desire.

True preferences

In the article, we attend to these objections. True preferences, we show, are quite essential to how we understand core concepts of moral philosophy, like autonomy and authenticity. We point to several plausible ways of understanding true preferences developed by philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt (higher-order preferences), Bernard Williams (authentic preferences), Tyler DesRoches (values-based preferences) and Mark Fabian and Malte Dold (agentic preferences). All of these understandings establish a connection between true preferences and the core concepts of moral philosophy.

All of these philosophers claim that some of our preferences are (more) special (than other preferences), as they express (more) closely who we are. They make up the kind of person we consider ourselves to be or that we aspire to become. Those who deny that true preferences exist or have special normative weight, we argue, undermine our ability to make sense of autonomy and authenticity. When people fail to act on their commitments, they are not leading the life they want to live. We need a notion of ‘true preferences’ to capture the fundamental thought that some of our preferences are more ‘ours’ and that others are more ‘alien’ to us.

Policy implications

So what does this mean for policy-makers? Knowing what you really, really want might be nice for yourself, your partner and your friends but should politicians and policy-makers be in the business of figuring out your deepest desires? In the article, we defend the case for ‘paternalistic nudges’ that promote true preferences. Policy-makers, in our view, can and should nudge citizens when they predictably veer off course and fail to satisfy their own true preferences.

So far, nudge advocates have mostly assumed what people’s true preferences might be. This has been heavily criticized as an objectionable kind of paternalism because it supposedly ends up with policy-makers imposing their values on citizens. Instead of really catering to people’s true preferences, policy-makers will nudge citizens in directions that the policy-makers regard as beneficial, be it health, wealth, or some other aspect of wellbeing. Say, people can be nudged into doing more regular check-ups, eat healthier food, or drive safely, all things that they surely prefer…or do they? How can policy-makers hope to find this out? Economists are all too keen to point out knowledge problems in government operations.

And while they make some important points, the knowledge problem for true preferences represents a challenge to be overcome, not a cause for defeatism. We are not helpless in its wake. It is perfectly possible to identify scenarios in which people predictably form false beliefs, exercise poor evaluative judgments or suffer from incompetence. We can use generalizations and statistical evidence for what contributes to a healthy and financially stable life and we can use surveys and other scientific methodologies to gauge people’s desires.

Importantly, we can do all of this while making absolutely sure that dissenters can go their separate ways. This is the advantage of nudges. They can help people get things right (when they steer them in the direction of a true preference), while preserving their freedom to resist (if they steer in the wrong direction). So, even if it turns out that you really prefer to watch rather than be a Spice Girl, you won’t be forced in either direction.