Relational equality and the status of animals
This is a guest post by Pablo Magaña and Devon Cass
Three challenges
Relational egalitarians believe we should eradicate certain inequalities of rank and status, such those based on gender, race, or caste. Almost without exception, these concerns are focused on humans (typically adult and able-minded). But it is worth noticing that nonhuman animals have also held, across time and space, drastically different statuses. Some have been treated as divinities to be revered, many more as plagues to be eradicated, and even a few as war enemies—as in Australia’s failed campaign against Emus. One might wonder then: can we apply the ideal of relational equality—or, more generally, a relational approach to justice—to our relationships with the other animals? This is a question few have addressed. (Two commendable exceptions are Andreas Bengtson’s “Animals and relational egalitarianism(s)”, and, with Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, “Relational egalitarianism and moral unequals”)
Well, that’s unsurprising, or so one may think. For the extension of relational egalitarianism to animals seems to stumble, at first glance, upon three significant obstacles. First, relational equality requires that we treat one another as equals, a kind of reciprocity to which animals cannot correspond (the absence of social relations problem). Second, even if humans and animals are socially unequal, it’s not clear why this would be objectionable. After all, animals do not seem to possess a sense of self-worth that could be damaged when treated as inferiors (the absence of understanding problem). Third, relational equality seems dependent or grounded on moral equality. But, many argue, humans and animals are not moral equals (the absence of moral equality problem).
In a recent paper in Philosophical Studies, we argue that this pessimism is premature. To answer the above problems, one may call into question their empirical assumptions. Perhaps, one could suggest, maybe some animals do possess a sense of self-worth that can be damaged when treated as inferiors. In our article, we pursue a different strategy: whatever the truth of the empirical assumptions, the three problems rest on a controversial (and, we suggest, mistaken) understanding of the demands of relational equality—or, more generally, relational justice.
Relational equality without reciprocity
We discuss, first, the absence of social relations problem. The problem arises, as we have seen, when we conceive of equality as a matter of reciprocal attitudes, behaviors, and dispositions. This interpersonal approach to relational equality is quite popular, but we should not accept it uncritically. Or, at least, we should not conclude it exhausts the ideal of relational equality. In a series of articles, one of us has developed an alternative institutional approach, which focuses on the kinds of status that formal institutions and informal social norms assign to individuals.
Consider, for instance, my status as a citizen. As a citizen, I enjoy a bundle of goods—certain rights, powers, and opportunities, such as the right to vote or to run for office. Political institutions can allocate these goods in different ways. And, in doing so, they express different attitudes towards citizens. If some citizens’ political rights are granted, say, on the basis of pity, the state is not treating them as equals. When this registers intersubjectively, becoming a matter of common knowledge, insult is added to injury. Civic status, then, involves objective, expressive, and intersubjective elements, which institutions can allocate in very different ways, and which fall neatly within the purview of relational egalitarianism.
This institutional approach, we show, can be applied to animals. Perhaps animals cannot treat humans as equals. But institutions can surely assign them different statuses, involving objective, expressive, and intersubjective elements. The Spanish government, for instance, recently strengthened legal protections for some animals. That is an example of a status inequality that seems perfectly tractable from an institutional approach.
Relational injustice without understanding
Tractable perhaps, one could grant, but normatively irrelevant, and so we need to address the absence of understanding problem. We concede, for the sake of the argument, that animals’ sense of self-worth cannot be affected by their being positioned in a hierarchy.
But this does not undermine applying the relational approach, we argue. First, because they can be harmed in many other ways by social inequality: the interests of a social inferior are much easier to disregard.
Second, and most crucially, we believe that the demands of relational justice (whether egalitarian or otherwise, as we will see next) arise when institutions coerce or exert profound influence over a sentient agent, human or non-human. Fulfilling such demands requires that we do not damage someone’s self-respect. This cannot be, however, the only relational wrong. Otherwise, it would implausibly follow that Dalit children are not wronged by social hierarchies until (and unless!) they develop a robust sense of self-respect.
Relational justice with and without moral equality
Finally, we turn to the absence of moral equality problem. While we are more uncertain, we inspect two potential strategies. If animals and humansare indeed moral equals, as some animal ethicists hold, or if relational equality does not imply moral equality, as argued by Andreas Bengston and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, the problem may be mitigated.
Things are more complicated, however, if relational equality does require moral equality, and if—as the standard view has it—animals and humans are moral unequals. If so, we may not be able to apply relational egalitarianism to animals. But, we contend, other relational approaches may remain perfectly applicable. Even if animals are not our moral equals, we argue, we may still be required to assign them a status proportional and commensurate to whatever moral status they happen to possess. In passing, we distinguish the relational proportionality view from one of ‘relational sufficiency’ proposed by others. The absence of moral equality, then, does not mean that a relational view of justice (and perhaps of equality) is not applicable to animals.
In sum, then, our paper aims to motivate a way in which relational (egalitarian or proportional) concerns might be applied to animals, and in doing so we hope to have developed our understanding of the nature and importance of the relational approach to justice.
Devon Cass is a Junior Researcher at the Nova University of Lisbon. He works on theories of social and intergenerational justice, relational egalitarianism, and republicanism. (Website: Devon Cass).
Pablo Magaña is an IRC postdoctoral researcher at Trinity College Dublin. He works on animal ethics, intergenerational justice, and democratic theory. (Website: Pablo Magaña).
