Category: Climate

Bednets versus Rocket Ships: Should we care more for people alive today or the future of humanity?

In this post, Elizabeth Hupfer (High Point University) discusses her article recently published in the Journal of Applied Philosophy on how to balance concern for the future of humanity with the needs of those alive today.

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Ever wonder why ChatGPT was invented? Or why billionaires have become so obsessed with rockets? The common thread in these questions is Longtermism. Longtermism is the view that concern for the long-term future is a moral imperative. The theory is caricatured by critics as a movement preoccupied with dystopian takeover by AI, a globe shrouded in nuclear winter, and colonization of distant planets. But at the heart of Longtermism are concepts intuitive to many: that future people’s lives matter and that it is good to ensure the survival of humanity. Yet, in our current world of scarce resources, Longtermist priority may go to future people at the expense of present people in need. In my paper I argue that Longtermists do not have a clear means of giving priority to people in need today without abandoning central tenets of the theory.

Longtermism

Longtermism has grown in popularity from a philosophical theory to a social movement that impacts Silicon Valley, US politics, international laws, and more. To understand this consequential theory, we need to look at two important components: time and quantity of future people.

First, Longtermists argue that time is not morally important. In What We Owe the Future, William MacAskill gives the example of a dropping a shard of glass on a hike. If you drop the glass and do not pick it up then you have harmed the person who steps on it, even if that person exists in the future.

Second, Longtermists argue that there are potentially tens of trillions of people who could exist in the future. There are various ways that Longtermists can calculate this number, but all that matters for our purposes is that it is a lot. A whole lot. More people than exist presently, and more people than have ever existed up to this point.

Combining the notion that time is not morally important and that there are a vast number of potential people, means that it is imperative to safeguard both the survival of humanity and the quality-of-life of future people.

Far-Future Priority Objection

What if this concern for the tens of trillions of future people comes at the expense of people who are living today? I call this the Far-Future Priority Objection: repeated instances of priority to far-future concerns will result in the systemic neglect of current people in the most need and potentially large-scale reallocation of resources to far-future interventions.

For example, Hilary Greaves and William MacAskill argue that the most effective way to save a current life through donation is providing insecticide-treated bednets in malaria zones. Their data shows that with these bednets, donating $100 is equivalent to saving 0.025 lives. But this is less effective than many Longtermists causes such asteroid deflection ($100 would result in around 300,000 additional lives), pandemic preparedness (200 million additional lives), and preventing AI takeover (one trillion additional lives). If Longtermists are concerned about efficiently doing the most good they can with a unit of resources (and I argue in my paper that they are), then Longtermist causes will trump even the most efficient causes for people alive today.

According to the Far-Future Priority Objection, repeated priority in this pattern could significantly shift overall resources away from those in need today over time, particularly those in low-income nations. Thus, widespread espousal of Longtermism may result in the global affluent turning their backs on these populations.

Potential Responses

In my paper, I analyse several potential responses the Longtermist could give to the Far-Future Priority Objection and argue that none of these responses can successfully mitigate the objection without abandoning basic tenets of Longtermism.

I will highlight one such argument here. Longtermists typically argue that far-future interventions cannot cause serious harm in the short term. According to my Far-Future Priority objection, individual instances of priority to the far future are not harmful but repeated instances may be. Take the following analogy: a law is enacted which is not explicitly discriminatory towards minority Group X. However, over time, implementation of the law results in resources, which would previously have gone to Group X, going to nearby (perhaps better off) Group Y. A decade later, Group X is significantly worse off. I think that one could reasonably argue that Group X was seriously harmed. Similarly, Longtermism does not intentionally or explicitly discriminate against current people, and it does not remove existing resources from them. Serious harm is likely caused nonetheless.

However, I argue that appealing to near-future serious harms results in either too strong or too weak of a response to the Far-Future Priority Objection and is not a viable avenue for the Longtermist. This is because one could be an absolutist about causing harm, which would mean that repeated priority to the future would be morally wrong and Longtermism would be undermined altogether. Alternatively, one could be a non-absolutist and say that the prevention of harm can be overridden when the stakes are high enough. Yet, since there could be tens of trillions of future lives at risk, the stakes will always be so high as to override the ban.

Conclusion

Longtermists have two options. First, they can bite the bullet and accept that Longtermism could result in systemic neglect of present people. This is counterintuitive to many. Second, they can create a new principle which allows for occasional priority for present people without abandoning basic tenets of the theory. In my paper, I analyse and dismiss several possible principles.


Elizabeth Hupfer’s research focuses on the intersection between normative/applied ethics and social/ political philosophy. She has published on distributive justice, coercion, humanitarianism, Effective Altruism, and Longtermism.

Quo vadis carbon tax?

Carbon taxes represent a key part of humanity’s current strategy to avoid global warming above 2 degrees Celsius. They work by making carbon-intensive activities more expensive, thus encouraging individuals to reduce these activities. Given the existential threat climate change poses to our societies, one would hope that such a key policy tool was both effective and enjoyed broad public support. Neither of these things are true today. Why is that and what needs to change?

The carbon tax is a so-called steering tax. Its goal is to change people’s behaviour, not to raise revenue for the government. The current version of the carbon tax in place in most countries does not change people’s behaviour as effectively as it could and should. To see why, consider two frequently ignored facts.

First, rich people emit considerably more than the average person. Studies on socioenvironmental inequality estimate that the top 10% of emitters are responsible for about 50% of individual carbon emissions. Think of private jets, which emit up to 4.5 tons of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e) per hour, that is three times as much as the average human on the planet can emit per year if we want to meet our climate targets. Second, someone who falls in this category will usually not even bat an eye at a carbon price of, say, 100 Euros per tCO2e, let alone change their consumption habits. For context, the price of carbon in the European Union Emissions Trading System has oscillated around 80 Euros per tCO2e over the last three years.

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Innocence and Agency: The ethics of child protests

In this post, Tim Fowler (University of Bristol) discusses his recently published article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy in which he explores whether children can be deemed as competent to engage in political activism.

The Fridays for Future or ‘Climate Strikes’ have been a striking feature of political action on climate change. Most associated with Greta Thunberg, these actions reveal the power of children to intervene effectively in political spaces. In doing so, they raise ethical, political, and sociological questions. In my paper I focus on two: first, whether recognizing children’s right to protest should affect the age thresholds for other activities, especially voting; and second, the impact on the child protesters themselves.

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Why it can be OK to have kids in the climate emergency

In this post, Elizabeth Cripps (University of Edinburgh) discusses her new article published in the Journal of Applied Philosophy, in which she explores whether it is justifiable to have children despite the carbon footprint it creates.

Credit: Andrea Thomson Photography.

In the US, having a child has a carbon price tag of 7 tonnes a year. In France, it’s 1.4 tonnes. Going vegan saves only 0.4 tonnes yearly, living car free 2.4 tonnes, and avoiding a Transatlantic flight 1.6 tonnes.

For those of us who have or want kids, this is an uncomfortable fact. We know we should pursue climate justice, including by cutting our own carbon impact. Does it follow that someone living an affluent life in a country like the UK or the US should stay childless?

Not necessarily. What’s more, by putting this argument under pressure, we learn some important lessons for moral philosophers. We need to talk more about individual sacrifice in the face of global emergencies. In so doing, we must engage carefully with sociological and psychological scholarship and attend to the insights of demographic groups who have experienced injustice.

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Redefining limited liability

Different phases of economic development call for different institutional arrangements. When an institution outlives the economic circumstances for which it was designed, it can lead to unintended negative consequences. The limited liability of corporations, at least under certain conditions, represents an example for such an institution.

Limited liability is one of the key features that distinguishes a partnership from a business corporation. When a partnership goes bankrupt, it is not just the capital of the partnership that is liable but also the private wealth of each of the partners. When a corporation goes bankrupt, by contrast, the reach of the creditors is limited to the capital that shareholders have invested in the corporation. They are off the hook as far as their private wealth is concerned.

It is easy to see why this arrangement leads to a significant increase in the capital that corporations are able to raise compared to partnerships. Which investor would turn down a setup with significant potential upside in terms of capital gain but limited downside? The justification for limited liability from a social perspective is equally obvious. Separating individual property from corporate property in this way hugely enhances financing capacity and thus output across the economy.

Limited liability under climate change

Limited liability worked well under conditions where any growth was good growth. However, independently of whether that was ever true, it is certainly not true in the 21st century. Some economic growth generates negative externalities in the form of social and environmental costs. Corporations only pay for the private costs of their production, whereas the social and environmental costs are borne by society as a whole.

The classic example in this category are greenhouse gas emissions. Corporations in the fossil fuel sector only pay for the private costs of getting the stuff out of the ground. Beyond the insufficient forms of carbon pricing in place today, corporations do not pay for the human and environmental costs measured in human deaths, respiratory disease from pollution, extreme weather events such as heat domes or atmospheric rivers, food shortages due to droughts, and loss in biodiversity. The results are overproduction and overconsumption of carbon-intensive products at inefficiently low prices.

Investor liability as a complement to carbon pricing

The conventional wisdom in the discipline of economics tells us that the most efficient way to reduce fossil fuel production and use to efficient levels is a form of carbon pricing, for example by charging a carbon tax. It is true that carbon taxes could be effective if they were both high enough and progressive. However, they clearly fall short on both counts today.

The above considerations point to a complementary regulatory lever. Under conditions of climate change, the justification for limited liability breaks down. Letting shareholders off the hook is not a good idea when doing so amplifies irresponsible corporate behaviour in the form of overproduction. Instead, in order to convince corporations to meet the challenge of producing sustainably, we have an interest to ensure that both the corporations and their investors have some skin in the game.

Note that this does necessarily imply that investors would have to be liable with all of their wealth, but a limited liability rather than zero liability would encourage corporations to price in negative externalities right away rather than wait for adequate levels of carbon pricing. One might also envisage a progressive form of liability where wealthier investors have more skin in the game than their less well-off counterparts. Indeed, if they did not, their incentives to invest responsibly would be reduced.

Extending the corporate time horizon

Corporations, their managers, and their shareholders are often criticized for maximising profit in the short-term. The current forms of carbon pricing have not succeeded in changing that. Redefining limited liability in the way sketched above promises to have an immediate impact in this regard. After all, under this arrangement, and in contrast to carbon pricing, it is not primarily up to the government to ensure that negative externalities are priced in, but it is up to the corporation and its investors. If the corporation and its shareholders get the numbers wrong, they will have to pay for it.

Some people will no doubt object that liability of this sort would represent a form of red tape restricting private business activity. They have things the wrong way round. Limited liability for shareholders is an enormous privilege bestowed on the corporate sector and its investors. As shown above, this privilege is no longer warranted, at least not for sectors with significant negative externalities. Today, corporations in the fossil fuel sector are able to privatise gains while they socialise losses. This is untenable. Reforming liability arrangements for these kinds of corporations offers one promising path of reform.

From the Vault: Nature, Animals, and the Environment

While Justice Everywhere takes a short break over the summer, we recall some of the highlights from our 2023-24 season. 

Student climate strike in Melbourne, Australia (2021). John Englart from Fawkner, Australia, CC BY-SA 2.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Here are a few highlights from this year’s posts on issues relating to nature, the environment, and animals:

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Stay tuned for even more on this topic in our 2024-25 season!

Justice Everywhere will return in full swing in September with fresh weekly posts by our cooperative of regular authors (published on Mondays), in addition to our Journal of Applied Philosophy series and other special series (published on Thursdays). If you would like to contribute a guest post on a topical justice-based issue (broadly construed), please feel free to get in touch with us at justice.everywhere.blog@gmail.com.

Is This Climate Justice? The Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union

Michael Coghlan, CC BY-SA 2.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

This is a guest post by Virginia De Biasio

In November 2023, Australia and Tuvalu, a small island country in the Pacific Ocean extremely vulnerable to climate change, signed the “Falepili Union” treaty. The treaty’s alleged purpose is to help Tuvalu to face the increasingly ravaging effects of climate change.

“Falepili” is a Tuvaluan word for giving to neighbours without expecting anything in return, as if they were family. It stands for the values of good neighbourliness, care and mutual respect. Not very surprisingly, the Falepili Union is a lot more than a friendly and mutually respectful treaty. Framed as climate justice, the treaty is underpinned by Australia’s geopolitical interests and a – not so respectful after all – form of neo-colonialism.

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Why Conscious AI Would Be Bad for the Environment

Image credit to Griffin Kiegiel and Sami Aksu

This is a guest post by Griffin Kiegiel.

Since the meteoric rise of ChatGPT in 2021, artificial intelligence systems (AI) have been implemented into everything from smartphones and electric vehicles, to toasters and toothbrushes. The long-term effects of this rapid adoption remain to be seen, but we can be certain of one thing: AI uses a lot of energy that we can’t spare. ChatGPT reportedly uses more than 500,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity daily, which is massive compared to the 29 kilowatt-hours consumed by the average American household.

As the global temperature and ocean levels rise, it is our responsibility to limit our collective environmental impact as much as possible. If the benefits of AI don’t outweigh the risks associated with increasing our rate of energy consumption, then we may be obligated to shut down AI for the sake of environmental conservation. However, if AI becomes conscious, shutting them down may be akin to murder, morally trapping us in an unsustainable system.

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The climate justice debate has a baseline problem

Humanity faces a number of daunting challenges in the 21st century. Climate change and socioeconomic injustice figure prominently on this list. When it comes to tackling these challenges, two possible strategies divide policy makers.

On the one hand, there are those who point out that addressing either of these problems on their own is a mammoth task, and that taking them on simultaneously is simply utopian. This view sometimes comes with a dose of optimism about technological solutions to climate change. On the other hand, an increasing number of voices argue that climate action can’t be separated from social justice. In particular, advocates of the latter position highlight the “triple inequality of climate change”: The global rich tend to pollute disproportionately and thus bear a heightened responsibility for climate change, the global poor are more vulnerable to its effects, and poor countries have fewer resources available for mitigation and adaptation. In political philosophy, we find a parallel divide between “isolationists” and “integrationists” respectively.

My point here will be to suggest that the case for integrationism is even stronger that even most of its ardent supporters acknowledge. To see why, consider the first of the inequalities mentioned in the previous paragraph. Studies suggest that, across countries, the top decile of polluters are responsible for about 50% of emissions, while the bottom 50% of polluters are only responsible for about 10% of emissions. Wealth strongly correlates with carbon-intensive activities – think everything from private jets and yachts, via mansion-size homes, to multiple trips by airplane per year or multiple cars in a single household.

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How the animal industry undermines consumers’ autonomy

In this post, Rubén Marciel (UPF and UB) and Pablo Magaña (UPF) discuss their article recently published in the Journal of Applied Philosophy on the ethical legitimacy of misleading commercial speech for ‘green’ or ‘ethically produced’ animal products.

Photo by Mae Mu with Unsplash Licence.
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