A collage of images, featuring most prominently a person holding a sign reading "no justice no peace"

Category: Governance

Climate / Distribution / Economics / Environment / General / Governance

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Quo vadis carbon tax?

Carbon taxes represent a key part of humanity’s current strategy to avoid global warming above 2 degrees Celsius. They work by making carbon-intensive activities more expensive, thus encouraging individuals to reduce these activities. Given the existential threat climate change poses to our societies, one would hope that such a key policy tool was both effective and enjoyed broad public support. Neither of these things are true today. Why is that and what needs to change?

The carbon tax is a so-called steering tax. Its goal is to change people’s behaviour, not to raise revenue for the government. The current version of the carbon tax in place in most countries does not change people’s behaviour as effectively as it could and should. To see why, consider two frequently ignored facts.

First, rich people emit considerably more than the average person. Studies on socioenvironmental inequality estimate that the top 10% of emitters are responsible for about 50% of individual carbon emissions. Think of private jets, which emit up to 4.5 tons of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e) per hour, that is three times as much as the average human on the planet can emit per year if we want to meet our climate targets. Second, someone who falls in this category will usually not even bat an eye at a carbon price of, say, 100 Euros per tCO2e, let alone change their consumption habits. For context, the price of carbon in the European Union Emissions Trading System has oscillated around 80 Euros per tCO2e over the last three years.

Progressive carbon taxes are more effective

In light of these facts, a carbon tax that ignores socioenvironmental inequality and charges everyone the same will leave the low-hanging fruit in terms of carbon emission reduction on the tree. Those who emit the most, often by spending on luxury items, will contribute hardly anything to emission reduction.

A progressive carbon tax would change that. The basic idea is to have different carbon tax brackets based on individual emissions: everyone would pay a low carbon price for reasonable carbon use; for instance, on your first 1.5 tCO2e of emissions, you would pay 50 Euros per tCO2e. Beyond that, the tax rate goes up. For people whose emissions are above a certain threshold, e.g. more than 35 tCO2e or more than three times the emissions of the average European citizen, the price per ton in the top bracket might reach prohibitive levels in the tens or hundreds of thousands of Euros per ton. The precise thresholds and tax rates are up for discussion, but the general idea is clear enough.

Some countries successfully use this approach in other policy areas. For example, in Finland and Switzerland, traffic fines are based on income. To make rich people reduce their speed, speeding tickets can rise to six- or seven-figure sums. To make them reduce their carbon footprint, a similar logic applies.

You might think a progressive carbon tax is difficult to implement. After all, do we know how much a person emits? Fortunately, fairly reliable proxies for the two main categories of greenhouse gas emissions, transport and housing, are already available. Data exists on who owns or uses what aircraft, cars or boats, and we also have good proxies for the carbon-intensity of building and heating homes.

Current, flat carbon tax: by elites, for elites

Many countries are currently experiencing political pushback against standard, flat carbon taxes. For example, Canada has just abolished consumer carbon taxes at the federal level and in most provinces. At first sight, the political frustration might seem surprising, given that many low-income Canadians in fact came out ahead under the former policy thanks to a generous rebate structure. In British Columbia, for instance, individuals with an annual income below $41,071 automatically received a rebate of $504 per year.

So why the popular discontent with the tax? Misinformation about rebates as well as a poorly justified general sentiment against any form of taxation certainly play a role. However, here is another explanation whose importance is underestimated. When communities have a common goal, it matters for members of the community to feel that everyone is pulling their weight to achieve that goal. Today’s carbon tax fails this test. The burden of adjustment in terms of reducing emissions falls squarely on low-income individuals, whereas the wealthy just shrug it off and pay the tax. Moreover, the fact that some portion of today’s income and wealth inequalities are perceived as unjust to begin with adds insult to injury.

Against this background, resentment against the current, flat carbon taxes in most countries is not only surprising, it is also legitimate. Even when taking rebates into account, the policy is rightly perceived as a policy by elites, for elites. A progressive carbon tax remedies this shortcoming.

This article is a modified version of a post in the Conversation Canada and informed by a paper published in Nature Sustainability in 2024.

Economics / General / Governance / Health / Liberty

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What I Really, Really Want: Why True Preferences Matter for Nudging

In this post, Bart Engelen (Tilburg University) and Viktor Ivanković (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb) discuss their recently published article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy, where they explore what it means to have ‘true preferences’ and how this affects our understanding of autonomy and nudging.

Failing to do what we really, really want seems all-too familiar in everyday life. You might want to lead a healthier lifestyle or aspire to a career in a girl band but turn out to be too sluggish to go for a run or practice your singing and dancing skills. If you really are committed to those aims, these are clear instances where you fail to satisfy your ‘true preferences’.

Laziness and akrasia

So, what is it that you really, really want? And why does it matter whether or not others can know your deepest desires? In our new article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy, we argue why some of your preferences are truer than others and why policy-makers can and should steer you in the direction of these preferences by nudging you when you veer off course.

Image from DHE-Art

True preferences, we contend, are real and should be taken seriously, by ourselves, by philosophers and by policy-makers. They are more fundamental and stable than our more superficial, impulsive and flimsy preferences. They also have special status and carry special normative weight. We care about them; it really matters to us whether or not we succeed in realizing what we set out to do, whether this is akin to a New Year’s resolution or something more vital to our central life plans.

All of this might sound rather obvious. Who would deny this? Oddly enough, more than a few (behavioral) economists do. In our article, we discuss and respond to three types of objections that they raise against true preferences. First, true preferences have been claimed not to exist. Even when preferences are incoherent, the objection goes, there is no indication as to why some preferences might be meaningfully “truer” than others.

And even if there are true preferences, a second objection states, they remain unknowable to others, and particularly to meddlesome governments. Of the many, changing and often incoherent preferences, how can one possibly single out those that are somehow true or special? How can an outsider know whether you suffer from procrastination or simply prefer not to chase after a life of fame?

Third, true preferences might simply lack normative weight and the fact that someone is veering of course might not justify governmental interference. Governments then, have no business promoting true preferences. Surely, policy-makers shouldn’t make it their business to help you become the next Mel B or Posh Spice, even if that is your deepest desire.

Image from Rawpixel.com

True preferences

In the article, we attend to these objections. True preferences, we show, are quite essential to how we understand core concepts of moral philosophy, like autonomy and authenticity. We point to several plausible ways of understanding true preferences developed by philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt (higher-order preferences), Bernard Williams (authentic preferences), Tyler DesRoches (values-based preferences) and Mark Fabian and Malte Dold (agentic preferences). All of these understandings establish a connection between true preferences and the core concepts of moral philosophy.

All of these philosophers claim that some of our preferences are (more) special (than other preferences), as they express (more) closely who we are. They make up the kind of person we consider ourselves to be or that we aspire to become. Those who deny that true preferences exist or have special normative weight, we argue, undermine our ability to make sense of autonomy and authenticity. When people fail to act on their commitments, they are not leading the life they want to live. We need a notion of ‘true preferences’ to capture the fundamental thought that some of our preferences are more ‘ours’ and that others are more ‘alien’ to us.

Policy implications

So what does this mean for policy-makers? Knowing what you really, really want might be nice for yourself, your partner and your friends but should politicians and policy-makers be in the business of figuring out your deepest desires? In the article, we defend the case for ‘paternalistic nudges’ that promote true preferences. Policy-makers, in our view, can and should nudge citizens when they predictably veer off course and fail to satisfy their own true preferences.

So far, nudge advocates have mostly assumed what people’s true preferences might be. This has been heavily criticized as an objectionable kind of paternalism because it supposedly ends up with policy-makers imposing their values on citizens. Instead of really catering to people’s true preferences, policy-makers will nudge citizens in directions that the policy-makers regard as beneficial, be it health, wealth, or some other aspect of wellbeing. Say, people can be nudged into doing more regular check-ups, eat healthier food, or drive safely, all things that they surely prefer…or do they? How can policy-makers hope to find this out? Economists are all too keen to point out knowledge problems in government operations.

And while they make some important points, the knowledge problem for true preferences represents a challenge to be overcome, not a cause for defeatism. We are not helpless in its wake. It is perfectly possible to identify scenarios in which people predictably form false beliefs, exercise poor evaluative judgments or suffer from incompetence. We can use generalizations and statistical evidence for what contributes to a healthy and financially stable life and we can use surveys and other scientific methodologies to gauge people’s desires.

Importantly, we can do all of this while making absolutely sure that dissenters can go their separate ways. This is the advantage of nudges. They can help people get things right (when they steer them in the direction of a true preference), while preserving their freedom to resist (if they steer in the wrong direction). So, even if it turns out that you really prefer to watch rather than be a Spice Girl, you won’t be forced in either direction.

Democracy / General / Governance / Social justice

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‘Flooding the zone’ and the politics of attention

Steve Bannon and Charlie Kirk speaking with attendees at the 2022 AmericaFest at the Phoenix Convention Center in Phoenix, Arizona. Photography by Gage Skidmore.

This is a guest post by Zsolt Kapelner (University of Oslo).

‘Flooding the zone’ is a term often used to describe the strategy Trump and his team have followed in recent weeks. This strategy involves issuing a torrent of executive orders, controversial statements, and the like with the aim of overwhelming the opposition and the media and creating confusion. Many have criticized this strategy and, in my view, rightly so. But what precisely is wrong with it? In this short piece I want to argue that ‘flooding the zone’ is not simply one of the, perhaps dirtier, tricks in the toolbox of democratic competition; instead, it is an inherently antidemocratic strategy which deliberately aims at exploiting one of our crucial vulnerabilities as a democratic public, i.e., our limited attentional capacity.

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Democracy / Governance / International / Liberty

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The Return of Parliaments? On France and South Korea’s resistance to authoritarian executives

On Wednesday 4 December 2024, French Prime Minister Michel Barnier was forced to resign after 3 short months in office – the shortest government in recent French history. On the very same day, in South Korea, President Yoon Suk Yeol was threatened with impeachment. What unites these two cases are attempts to ascertain power and bypass parliaments, in a context of budgetary disagreements. These cases remind us of the importance and democratic value of parliamentary assemblies, which have frequently been sidelined in favor of executives in recent decades.

National Assembly, Seoul
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Democracy / Governance / Liberty / Public Philosophy

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Free Speech for Political Campaign Lies?

On Tuesday, November 5, citizens of the United States will vote for who they want to serve as their president for the next four years. They will also vote for federal congressional representatives as well as a host of other state and local government officials.

U.S. political campaigns—especially presidential campaigns—are exhausting. This is in part because they are much longer and more expensive than the political campaigns in many other nations.

Another reason why many seem to have found the last three presidential campaigns exhausting is the sheer volume and brazenness of the lies told by Donald Trump and many other Republicans who have come to mimic his campaign style. Trump’s lies have reinforced partisan epistemology while simultaneously creating epistemic chaos that he seeks to use to his advantage.

He has successfully used lies to undermine public trust in U.S. elections. This is starkly exhibited by the fact that nearly 30% of Americans—including roughly two thirds of Republicans—say they believe that the 2020 U.S. Presidential election was stolen.

At least part of the reason that so many Americans believe this patent falsehood is because Trump and his allies have told this lie repeatedly. However, it seems that Trump and his allies don’t really believe it because they have been unwilling to make these same claims in court or in other contexts in which they could face legal sanctions for lying.

In the United States, freedom of speech protects one’s right to lie on the campaign trail but not in the courtroom. In the latter context, liars can be convicted of perjury.

This helps explain the truth-revealing power of courts. The best explanation for why Trump and his co-conspirators refuse to make these false claims about the 2020 election in court where they realize that lying can have significant legal consequences is that they know they are lying.

If significant legal consequences for lying are enough to stop Trump and his co-conspirators from lying in court, one might naturally conclude that the best course of action might be to create similarly significant legal consequences for lying as part of political campaigning. This is a reasonable thought, but it’s not that simple—at least not in the United States. This is because such a course of action conflicts with contemporary social and legal understandings of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution’s protection of free speech.

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Democracy / Governance / International / Social justice

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At last, justice for the Chagos Islanders?

Aerial photograph of the coconut plantation at East Point, Diego Garcia. Photograph shows strip of land between both ocean and lagoon, with the dilapidated plantation buildings sitting in a lawn surrounded by coconut trees.
Aerial photograph of an abandoned coconut plantation at East Point, Diego Garcia. See page for author, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Last week, the news that the UK has agreed to return the Chagos Islands to Mauritius was widely reported. The agreement was denounced by many in the British press and political establishment – including by all current candidates for leadership of the Conservative Party. On the other hand, in other quarters the deal was greeted with cautious optimism. US President Joe Biden welcomed the agreement as a “clear demonstration that … countries can overcome longstanding historical challenges to reach peaceful and mutually beneficial outcomes”. In a joint statement, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Mauritius Prime Minister Pravind Jugnauth called it “a seminal moment in our relationship and a demonstration of our enduring commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes and the rule of law”.

Among Chagossians the feelings seem more mixed. Some see it as a step in the right direction, suggesting that Mauritius is more likely to put resettlement plans in place. Others, however, have criticised the fact that, even in a decision like this, Chagossians have been systemically excluded from the discussion. One group representing Chagossians in the UK, Mauritius and the Seychelles claimed that “Chagossians have learned this outcome [of the negotiations] from the media and remain powerless and voiceless in determining our own future and the future of our homeland”. Others, speaking to the BBC, expressed frustration that, once again, decisions about their future were made without their input.

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Democracy / Distribution / Economics / General / Governance / Punishment / Social justice

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From the Vault: Justice, Democracy, and Society

While Justice Everywhere takes a short break over the summer, we recall some of the highlights from our 2023-24 season. 

A person casts a vote during the 2007 French presidential election. Rama, CC BY-SA 2.0 FR https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/fr/deed.en, via Wikimedia Commons

Here are a few highlights from this year’s writing on a wide range of issues relating to justice, society and democratic systems:

Stay tuned for even more on this topic in our 2024-25 season!

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Justice Everywhere will return in full swing in September with fresh weekly posts by our cooperative of regular authors (published on Mondays), in addition to our Journal of Applied Philosophy series and other special series (published on Thursdays). If you would like to contribute a guest post on a topical justice-based issue (broadly construed), please feel free to get in touch with us at justice.everywhere.blog@gmail.com.

Democracy / General / Governance

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Protecting Territorial Minorities: Defensive Federalism

In this post Marc Sanjaume-Calvet (Universitat Pompeu Fabra), discusses the role of federalism as a way of protecting from the tyranny of the majority, safeguarding both against the ills of centralised power and territorial self-government. The reflections in this post stems from his recently published book, coedited with Professor Ferran Requejo (UPF), Defensive Federalism Protecting Territorial Minorities from the “Tyranny of the Majority” (2023, Routledge).

Image by George Becker from Pexels
Image by George Becker from Pexels
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Environment / Governance / Moral values / Technology

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Driving for Values

Smart cities are full of sensors and collect large amounts of data. One reason for doing so is to get real-time information about traffic flows. A next step is to steer the traffic in a way that contributes to the realisation of values such as safety and sustainability. Think of steering cars around schools to improve the safety of children, or of keeping certain areas car-free to improve air quality. Is it legitimate for cities to nudge their citizens to make moral choices when participating in traffic? Would a system that limits a person’s options for the sake of improving quality of life in the city come at the cost of restricting that person’s autonomy? In a transdisciplinary research project, we (i.e., members of the ESDiT programme and the Responsible Sensing Lab) explored how a navigation app that suggests routes based on shared values, would affect users’ experiences of autonomy. We did so by letting people try out speculative prototypes of such an app on a mobile phone and ask them questions about how they experienced different features of the app. During several interviews and a focus group, we gained insights about the conditions under which people find such an app acceptable and about the features that increase or decrease their feeling of autonomy.

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Democracy / General / Governance / Health

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Why policymakers should care about post-truth

Post-truth is often viewed as a threat to public affairs such as vaccination policy, climate change denialism, or the erosion of public discourse. Yet combating post-truth is rarely viewed as a priority for policymakers, and the preferred ways of combating it usually take the form of localised epistemic interventions such as fact-checking websites or information campaigns.

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